Efficiency of Pro-Poor Public Spending: Does the Quality of the Public Financial Management (PFM) System Matter? A Cross-Section Study by Grundström, Malin
  
 
Efficiency of Pro-Poor Public Spending: Does the Quality of 
the Public Financial Management (PFM) System Matter? 
A Cross-Section Study 
 
Malin Grundström  
August 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Lund University 
Department of Economics 
Master’s Thesis 
Supervisor: Åsa Hansson  
 
 
Abstract 
Pro-poor public spending is an important tool used for promoting development and poverty 
reduction. Yet, it has been hard to find evidence that public spending actually translates into 
desired outcomes. Public financial management (PFM) systems have been pointed out as 
one vital factor affecting public spending efficiency, but this has yet not been confirmed in 
any empirical research. By using new data available from two indexes assessing the quality 
of the PFM system, this thesis assess whether the quality of the PFM system increases 
efficiency of public spending within the health- and education sectors. Efficiency of public 
spending within the two sectors is measured as child (under-5) mortality and education 
attainment. The results do not give any support to the assumed positive relationship 
between the quality of the PFM system and public spending efficiency. Due to limitations 
related to data, such as small sample sizes, the hypothesis should yet not be ruled out. No 
general conclusion is therefore drawn and the advices from this, first study assessing the 
PFM systems importance, is to analyze the presumed relationship further. 
Recommendations are to use a more comprehensive set of data and dependent variables 
which are more closely linked to public spending efficiency. 
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1 Introduction 
In 1990s, the global community acknowledged that economic growth itself is not necessarily 
developmental and focus has been redirected from economic development into poverty 
reduction and human development. With this change, it has been a re-acknowledgement of 
the role of the government and public expenditure. Today, governments are thus 
encouraged to use public recourses on “pro-poor” services. (Andrews, 2009:3f; Simson, 
2012:1, 5; Wilhelm and Fiestas, 2005:2) Subsequently, investments have been redirected 
from the productive sector toward the social sector and pro-poor allocation of the budget is 
widely recognized as a key instrument for reducing poverty. (Curran and de Renzio, n.d.:6; 
Wilhelm and Fiestas, 2005:v)  
Despite the focus on, and the seemingly broad consensus on, the importance of public 
spending, there is surprisingly little evidence assuring that public spending actually has a 
positive effect on service outcomes and poverty reduction (Wilhelm and Fiestas, 2005:5). 
There are several empirical studies analyzing public spending’s effect on poverty and on 
economic growth, and public spending is found to have a positive effect in some studies 
while no relationship is found in others.  
So how come public spending is transformed into desired public service- and poverty 
outcomes in some cases while it in others does not seem to have an effect? Wilhelm and 
Fiestas (2005:7) argue that countries’ institutional setting determines the feasibility of policy 
interventions, and that high quality public sector institutions improve public service delivery. 
In line with this, the World Bank means that, although public resources are allocated on the 
right goods and services, it is hard to achieve desired social service outcomes if the budget 
institutions are malfunctioning. The World Bank further argues that poor public financial 
management (PFM) systems, is one of the main explanatory factors to why governments 
face difficulties in transforming public spending into efficient public services (World Bank, 
2003 in Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008:96f).  
Although the quality of institutions, and the PFM system, is assumed to affect efficiency of 
public spending, few studies have been carried out in this area. Rajkumar and Swaroop 
(2008) as well as Wilhelm and Fiesta (2005) therefore argue that the impact of institutional 
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constraints on public spending needs to be examined further. Similarly, Wescott (2009:22) 
writes that: “Although it is presumed that better PFM processes will contribute to better 
service outcomes, that needs to be separately validated”. 
A reason why this assumption has not been analyzed might frankly be the lack of a good set 
of data capturing the quality of PFM systems. However, the World Bank, together with other 
actors1, initiated a program in 2001 in order to create a method to measure countries PFM 
performance, called the Public Financial Management Performance Measurement 
Framework (PEFA). The PEFA method is now an internationally accepted and standardized 
instrument for measuring the equality of PFM systems, and the assessments provide reliable 
information on the performance of countries PFM systems, processes and institutions. (PEFA 
Secretariat, n.d.) de Rensio et al. (2011:7) write that the: “PEFA assessments are a unique 
source of information, a new dataset which sheds light on an aspect of governance which 
until very recently had been mostly overlooked”.  
The PEFA initiative has not only resulted in a rather large data set including PEFA 
assessments from various countries from 2005 to 2012, but has also been used as a temple 
for the World Bank’s PFM rating included in their annual Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessments (CPIA), which now also provide a rather substantial source of information over 
the quality of countries PFM systems. 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the quality of the PFM system’s effect on the 
efficiency of public spending. By taking advantage of the data now available from the PEFA 
initiative, this is, to the author’s awareness, the first empirical study over the presumed 
relationship. The aim is to contribute to the understanding of why public spending 
sometimes translates into desired outcomes, while it fails in others. 
The theoretical framework is based on new institutional economic theory, with the 
assumption that institutions influence development, poverty reduction and also efficiency of 
public spending. The hypothesis is that the quality of the PFM system affects the efficiency 
of public spending, and that a good system makes it easier to translate public spending into 
                                                     
1
 IMF, DIFID, MAEE, Norad and SECO 
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desired public service outcomes. The research question follows: Does the quality of public 
financial management (PFM) system affect the efficiency of pro-poor public spending? 
1.2 Method and Data 
To take advantage of all available information regarding the quality of the PFM system, data 
from the PEFA assessments as well as the CPIA index is used. Efficiency of public spending is 
measured through assessing outcomes in the health- and education sectors, proxied as child 
(under-5) mortality and education attainment. Four cross-sectional Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions are performed with the PEFA- and CPIA data sets, two assessing health- 
and two education outcomes. To capture the effects of the quality of the PFM system on 
public spending efficiency, a multiplicative interaction term is used. 
1.3 Limitations 
The main limitations of this study are caused by lack of data. The earliest data of the quality 
of the PFM system is from 2005, limiting the analysis to cross-section regressions. Moreover, 
data for several variables is scarce resulting in small sample sizes ranging between 34 and 
37. This might decrease the precision of the estimations and the ability to generalize the 
results, while it also increases the risk of measurement errors. The limitations occurring from 
lack of data are decreased by using both the PEFA- and the CPIA index as measurements of 
the quality of the PFM system, and by looking on both the health- and education sector. 
However, the problems still persists and precautions have to be taken when interpreting the 
results as well as drawing conclusions based upon them.  
1.4 Disposition 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters and proceeds as following. First, an overview over 
previous research regarding public spending and PFM is presented followed by a 
presentation of the theoretical framework. Chapter four and five present the method and 
the data used. The results and robustness controls are thereafter presented followed by a 
discussion of the results in chapter seven. Lastly, concluding remarks are found in chapter 
eight. 
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2 Literature Review 
There are many studies that analyze the effect of public spending on economic growth and 
poverty reduction, e.g. Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990, 1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Devarajan et al. (1996), Mittnik and Neumann (2003), and De la 
Croix and Delavallade (2009). Yet, no unequivocal picture appears and the results vary 
significantly among countries and type of sectors. Looking at the two sectors in focus in this 
study, there is neither any conclusive evidence on whether public education- and health 
spending have a positive impact on service outcomes such as education- and health status 
(Gupta et al. 1999:4). 
Several studies analyzing the link between public education spending and education 
attainment find only a weak positive- or non-existent relationship (Landau, 1986; Noss, 
1991; Mingat and Tan, 1992, 1998; Flug et al., 1998). Harbison and Hanushek (1992) 
reviewed 12 studies looking at this relationship in developing countries and found that half 
of the studies did find a statistically significant relationships while the other half did not find 
such evidence (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002:97). Some variables found to have an impact 
on education attainment is per capita income, the age distribution of the population, 
parental perception of cost and benefits of education, family background, and parental 
education (Appleton et al., 1996; Flug et al., 1998; Mingat and Tan, 1992). 
The picture of the literature assessing the effect of public health spending on health service 
outcomes is similar. Several studies find that public spending impact on health status 
measured as infant- or child mortality is small or statistically insignificant (Aiyer et al., 1995; 
Kim and Moody, 1992; McGuire et al., 1993; Musgrove, 1996; Filmer and Pritchett, 1997; 
Filmer, et al., 1998). Regarding other factors affecting health outcomes, Carrin and Politi 
(1995) found poverty ratios and income levels crucial for countries health status.  The 
importance of income is confirmed by Filmer and Pritchett (1999:1309, 1317) which found 
that 95% of cross-national variation in child mortality could be explained by income per 
capita, income inequality, level of female education, level of ethnic fragmentation, and 
predominant religion. Comparing the two sectors, Lopez (2002) found public spending to 
better explain positive education than health outcomes. Moreover, the correlation was 
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stronger when using government spending in per capita terms and as a share of GDP, than 
spending as share of government spending. (Lopez, 2002: 11-14) 
Several studies have searched for possible explanations to the varied results from studies 
assessing the relationship between public spending and public service outcomes. The spark 
of interest for the role of institutions within the development field has increased the number 
of studies trying to shed a light over institutions’ role for economic growth and different 
developmental outcomes. Jutting (2003) reviews literature regarding the relationship 
between institutions and development indicators. According to him, the evidence from 
cross-sectional studies ensures the importance of institutional quality for economic growth 
and development. Yet, the literature review reveals a disagreement over the relative 
importance of various institutions. (Jutting, 2003:19) 
Kaufmann et al. (1999) and Kaufman et al. (2004) find that institutional indicators, such as 
voice and accountability, political stability and violence, government effectiveness, and 
regulatory burden and rule of law have a strong direct impact on infant mortality. In another 
study by De La Croix and Delavallade (2006) it was found that countries with high corruption 
tend to invest more in physical capital than in health and education. Thus, evidence shows 
that institutions might have a direct effect on health- and education outcomes. So what is 
the status on research around institutions’ impact on the transformation of public spending 
into desired service outcomes?  
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) attempt to get some clarifications over the relationship 
between public spending and health- and education outcomes, measured as infant mortality 
and primary education failure rate, by analyzing the importance of the quality of 
governance. Their results show that the efficacy of public health spending is positively 
related to the level of governance.2 Assessing the effect of public education spending gives a 
similar picture. 3  Hence, their study show that good governance, measured as well-
                                                     
2
 1% increase in the share of public health spending in GDP lowers the under-5 mortality rate by 0.32% in 
countries with good governance, 0.20% in countries with average governance, and has no impact in countries 
with weak governance. (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002) 
3
 1% point increase in the share of public education spending in GDP lowers the primary education failure rate 
by .70% in countries with good governance, and has no discernible impact in countries with weaker 
governance. (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002) 
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functioning bureaucracies and low corruption, seem to be vital in order to be able to 
transform public spending in to good public service. (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008: 98-105) 
As mentioned, the PFM system is often mentioned to be one factor affecting public spending 
efficiency. Yet, there are no studies assessing whether the suggested relationship is valid or 
not. A review over the existing studies including the PEFA assessments, the most 
acknowledged measurement of the quality of PFM system, shows that the most studies 
analyze the performance of PFM systems, PFM reforms, and what factors are likely to affect 
PFM systems and PFM reforms (Porter et al., 2010; de Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007; de 
Renzio, 2009; de Renzio et al. 2011; and World Bank 2010b, 2012b).  The quality of the PFM 
system is hence often used as the dependent variable. One study where PFM is used as the 
explanatory variable is one by Dabla-Noris et al. (2010:20) which assess PFM systems’ effect 
on fiscal performance. The results show that countries with a good PFM system tend to have 
higher fiscal balances and lower debt. 
Wescott argues that, although it is presumed that the quality of PFM system has an impact 
on service outcomes, the relationship needs to be validated (Wescott 2008 in Andrews, 
2009:6). He argues that more work is needed in order to confirm the suggested link between 
the quality of the PFM system and public spending efficiency (Wescott, 2009:150). Also, 
Pretorius and Pretorius question whether enough attention is being paid to the service 
delivery perspective in PFM reforms. According to them, there are no evaluations over PFM 
reforms’ influence on service delivery. In their review over PFM reform literature, nine 
knowledge gaps are addressed. One concerns the link between PFM reforms and service 
delivery and whether improved PFM systems could contribute to improved service delivery. 
(Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008:Xiii, 41, 49) 
This study aims to initiate the assessment of the importance of PFM quality in attaining 
desired public service outcomes through public spending. This is hence a first attempt to fill 
the knowledge gap pointed out in the PFM literature and the hope is to provide a base and a 
source for discussion for future research within the area. 
7 
 
3 Theory 
3. 1 Pro-Poor Public Spending 
The term pro-poor is commonly used in the development literature. Pro-poor policies can be 
referred to as policies, and public expenditures, which reduce poverty, hence, benefit and 
target poor people (Curran and de Renzio, n.d.:1; Cuesta. et.al., 2012:35). Efficiency of pro-
poor public spending can thus be measured through assessing whether public spending 
results in reduced poverty4.  
There is no universal recipe with the optimal mixture of public spending to reduce poverty. 
The constellation of suitable public spending is rather said to be country specific, and what 
can be seen as pro-poor spending varies between countries. (IMF and World Bank, 2001:8) 
Curran and de Renzio (n.a.:5) argue that each country has to find their own constellation of 
expenditures that is appropriate for the country specific context and circumstances.  
The traditional definition of pro-poor spending often includes social sector spending on 
health, education and social services. These sectors are also given much attention in the 
general development discourse. In the Human Development Index (HDI), education and 
health are given two thirds weight in the index. Moreover, four out of the eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) concerns issues regarding health and education. However, the 
definition has broadened, and pro-poor spending is now also often referring to spending 
supporting elements of the productive sector, and spending directed towards empowering 
women. (Peters, 2002:8f)  
Hence, pro-poor spending consists of a broad based set of expenditures, which also are 
specific to each country’s needs and circumstances. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, 
pro-poor spending is limited to spending within the health- and education sectors. The 
benefit of choosing these sectors is the relatively good availability of data regarding public 
                                                     
4
 There are many definitions of poverty. Here it refers to the definition stated at the World Summit on Social 
Development in Copenhagen in 1995 which follows: “Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of 
income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill 
health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from 
illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and exclusion. It 
is also characterized by a lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social and cultural life.” (United 
Nations, 1995) 
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spending and service outcomes. Further, it allows comparison with previous research within 
the area, as these sectors are widely used in development- and public service research. 
The failure of pro-poor public spending   As mentioned in the Introduction, public spending 
does not always result in desired public service outcomes. The World Bank argues that many 
governments fail to fulfill their obligation to provide public education and healthcare to the 
poor and points out four main reasons for this: Most government spending benefits the non-
poor: Problems with getting the money to the front line service provider: Poor incentives for 
effective service delivery for public servants: Low demand for public service from the poor. 
(World Bank, 2003:3f, 39) Moreover, Wilhelm and Fiestas argue that public spending 
efficiency is affected by country specific conditions, such as level of urbanization, 
demographic structure, regional poverty patterns, etc. They further emphasize the role of 
countries institutional settings. (2005:v, 6, 22) North defines institutions as: “The formal and 
informal rules of the economic game” (Todaro and Smith, 2002:79). Formal institutions 
include constitutions and laws governing economies and politics, and the informal include 
customs, traditions and taboos (Aron, 2000:103). 
The World Bank states that: “It may be known how to educate a child or stop an infant from 
dying. But institutions are needed that will educate a generation of children or reduce infant 
mortality by two-thirds” (2003:17). According to them, the main cause making services fail 
the poor is inadequate institutional arrangement, and they argue that it is vital to have 
institutions that increase efficiency and accountability (World Bank 2003:46, 58). Not only 
has it been proved that institutions have a large impact on growth and poverty, but also on 
policy intervention outcomes. According to Wilhelm and Fiestas (2005:6), high quality public 
sector institutions are accompanied with improved public service delivery which could be 
explained by enhanced capacity, better incentives for public service providers and increased 
accountability. 
3.2 Public Financial Management 
According to Rajukamar and Swaroop (2007:97), one of the main reasons why governments 
fail to translate public spending into efficient services is poor budget management. Many 
argue that the quality of the PFM systems have a large impact on whether pro-poor 
spending will be transformed to desired service outcomes, the success of implementation of 
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fiscal and pro-poor policies, economic growth, and poverty reduction5. Peters (2002:9) 
argues that in order to improve education outcomes and productivity in primary health care, 
it is critical to improve the efficiency of resource management in existing public programs. 
According to Simson (2012:7), the importance of strengthening the PFM system is gaining 
attention. The role of the PFM system is also highlighted in the international development 
discourse by various actors and the importance of improving PFM systems is e.g. pointed out 
in the Paris Declaration. Good and credible PFM systems are often a prerequisite for 
obtaining budget support. Also, in the initiative giving debt relief to highly indebted poor 
countries (HIPC), it is not only a focus on improving public spending, but also improving 
budget execution (Peters, 2002:10; Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008:5f). 
There is not one universal definition of the PFM system. One narrow definition is that the 
PFM system is the downstream activities of budget execution, control, accounting, reporting, 
monitoring and evaluation. More widely, the PFM system could also include activities such 
as preparation and fulfillment of the budget cycle, budget oversight and control, taxing and 
debt management, procurement, and resource allocation, all inter-related subsystems of the 
PFM system as a whole (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008:iii, vii, 2). 
In the PEFA framework, the PFM system is divided into three sub-groups: A. Budget 
credibility: B. Comprehensiveness and transparency: C. Budget cycle.6 The last sub-group C is 
divided into; policy-based budgeting; predictability and control in budget execution; 
accounting, recording and reporting; and external scrutiny and audit. See Figure 3.1 for 
illustration and Appendix A for further explanation. It is the institutions and processes 
involved in these three parts that defines the PFM system in this study. In the section below, 
the sub-groups are explained further as their linkage to public spending efficiency is 
discussed. 
                                                     
5
 Mentioned by: Curran and de Renzio, na:6; Dabla-Norris. et. al., 2010:3; de Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007:2ff; 
Peters, 2002:1; Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008:iii, vii;  Wescot, 2009:141; and Wilhelm and Fiestas, 2005:19. 
6
 Donor practices are also included in the PEFA assessments. However, it is excluded in this study since the 
focus is on the PFM quality and within country and national practices. The three sub-groups are all divided into 
performance indicators (PI), and the whole assessment includes 28 PIs, excluding donor practices (including 
three indicators) 
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Figure 3.1: Structure and coverage of the PFM system as measured in the PEFA assessments 
(PEFA Secretariat 2005:4) 
 
 
3.3 Public Financial Management and Pro-Poor Public Spending Efficiency 
The PEFA Secretariat (2011:6) argues that an orderly and open PFM system supports 
efficiency of service delivery. There are several possible causal links between the quality of 
the PFM system and the efficiency of public spending. Below are examples of possible 
negative impacts on public spending efficiency likely to occur due to malfunctioning and 
poor PFM systems. The disposition follows the PEFA’s division of the PFM system into the 
three sub-systems, A-C, presented in Figure 3.1 above. 
A. Budget Credibility   The PEFA Secretariat (2011:66) means that the budget has to be 
realistic and implemented as passed in order for it to be a tool for policy implementation. 
They argue that: “Adjustments [of the budget] may fall disproportionately on non-salary 
recurrent expenditures, which are likely to have significant impact on the efficiency of 
resources used at the service delivery level.” (ibid.) Since front line service deliverers are 
furthest out in the resource allocation chain, they are the units that suffers most when 
expenditures exceed budget estimates, or when resources are re-directed for other 
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purposes (ibid:43). Also Peters (2002:2f), argues that programs designed to benefit poor 
people often are harmed when executed budgets differ from the original plan. One 
explanation for this is that: ”Non-compliance with the budget may lead to a shift across 
expenditure categories, reflecting personal preferences rather than efficiency of service 
delivery.” (PEFA Secretariat, 2011:66) Finally, bad forecasting of revenues makes it harder to 
address spending imbalances and to promote poverty reduction through the preparation 
and execution of the budget. It also makes it more difficult to conduct adequate analysis of 
the composition of expenditures within and across sectors, which in turn makes it harder to 
ensure alignment with poverty concerns. (Fozzard et al., 2001:9)  
B. Comprehensiveness and Transparency7   Comprehensiveness of the budget is vital to 
ensure that government operations take place within its fiscal policy framework and are 
subjected to adequate budget management and reporting arrangements according to the 
PEFA Secretariat (2011:66), which also writes that: 
“Lack of comprehensiveness is likely to increase waste of resources and decrease the provision of 
services. It limits competition in the review of the efficiency and effectiveness of the different 
programs and their inputs. It may also facilitate the development of patronage or corrupt 
practices by limiting the scrutiny of operations, expenditures and procurement processes not 
integrated in budget management and reporting arrangements.” (PEFA Secretariat, 2011:66) 
Further, the PEFA Secretariat (2011:18) means that lack of comprehensiveness of 
information in budget documentation decreases the possibility to hold actors accountable 
and makes it harder to control whether the budget aligns with country priorities. Another 
aspect mentioned by the World Bank (2003:181) is that an incomprehensive budget and bad 
revenue forecasting can result in aggregate fiscal deficits. Deficits can in turn be translated 
into financial crisis, forcing governments to cut basic services. 
Transparency of the budget is also vital for public spending efficiency. Transparency enables 
external scrutiny of government policies and programs and their implementation (PEFA 
Secretariat, 2011:66). An opaque budget process is decreasing the publics’ insight in the 
budget process and the PEFA Secretariat means that: “Lack of transparency limits the 
availability of information on the resources available for the service delivery units. This 
                                                     
7
 Transparency can be defined as public dissemination of information and decision making so that the public 
can assess whether public interests is being served (Herbert, 2007:262). 
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weakens the capacity of local communities to exercise any scrutiny on the resources 
allocated and used at the service delivery units.” (ibid.) 
The importance of transparency is also recognized by the World Bank (2000:9, 48), and 
according to them is the budget offering a way for citizens to hold service providers 
accountable8. Without public access to information on the budget, citizens’ ability to 
influence and monitor public sector performance is reduced (ibid.). This can also open up for 
corruption as low transparency decreases the cost for politicians and public servants to 
break rules, agreements and promises. If expenditure allocations and planned expenditures 
stay un-published, it is easier to alter plans since the general public is unlikely to demand 
explanations. An opaque budget will hence make it easier for the government to abandon 
expenditure priorities. (Campos and Pradhan, 1996:9; Peters, 2002:9) Tracking expenditures 
in Uganda is a good example of the importance of transparency. Leakages in the education 
sector were found and only 13% of intended expenditures reached primary schools in one 
area. When the information was published, the resources reaching schools rose to 80%. 
(World Bank, 2003:87) 
C The Budget Circle 
C.i  Policy-Based Budgeting   A policy-based budget process enables the government to plan 
the use of resources in line with its fiscal policy and national strategy (PEFA Secretariat, 
2011:67). The PEFA Secretariat argues that: “A poor budget process does not allow 
discussions over efficiency in the use of resources. In particular, it does not allow an orderly 
review of existing policies and new policy initiatives.” (ibid.) To have a long time perspective 
when planning the budget is also of importance. Without multiyear expenditures 
frameworks, tradeoffs across sectors and time are less transparent. It also makes it harder to 
link short-term macro-economic stabilization needs with medium- and long term demands 
on the budget. This could be harmful for policy design and planning, and subsequently also 
deteriorate efficiency of service delivery. (Holmes and Evans, 2003:5, World Bank, 2003:183, 
193) Moreover, in order to align the budget with macro-economic, fiscal and sector policies, 
it is important that relevant actors participate in the budget process. Finally, if the budget is 
                                                     
8
 The World Bank define accountability as a relationship among actors that has five features; delegation, 
finance, performance, information about performance, and enforceability (2003:47). 
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not passed in time, government activities, such as public service provision, might be delayed. 
(PEFA Secretariat, 2011:24) 
C.ii Predictability and Control in Budget Execution   According to the PEFA Secretariat 
(2011:67), predictable and controlled budget executions are necessary to enable effective 
management of policy and program implementation. If flows of resources are unpredictable, 
it is harder for front-line service deliverers to plan and use the resources in a timely and 
efficient manner. Another consequence is that it might foster an environment where 
controls are habitually by-passed. (ibid.) Regarding control of the budget, the PEFA 
Secretariat argues that: “Inadequate controls of payrolls, procurement and expenditure 
processes may create the opportunity for corrupt practices, leakages and patronage.” (ibid.) 
According to the World Bank (2003:185), the quality of procurement systems influence 
transparency, contestability, accountability, and efficiency of the PFM system. Leakages, 
primarily through fraud and corruption, can in turn result in poor-quality of public services 
(ibid.). Also the PEFA Secretariat (2011:67) means that poor procurement systems are likely 
to limit efficiency of public programs by increasing the costs or leading to inadequate quality 
of procured goods or services. 
Further, poor quality of the tax system could affect spending efficiency negatively through; 
tax revenues (through decreased tax compliance and collection); poor revenue estimation; 
and poor availability and timeliness of tax transfers to treasury (PEFA Secretariat, 2011, 28-
32). Overall, weak budget execution harms beneficiaries of government services, especially 
the poor. Concrete results could be that hospitals obtain insufficient supplies and equipment 
and therefore have low capacity, or that schools do not receive school materials so that the 
quality of education decreases. (Peters, 2002:7) 
C.iii Accounting, Recording and Reporting   “A lack of information on how resources have 
been provided and used for service delivery is likely to undermine the planning and 
management of services.” (PEFA Secretariat, 2011:68) The PEFA Secretariat therefore argues 
that timely, relevant and reliable financial information is required to support all fiscal- and 
budget management and decision-making processes. (ibid.) They further mean that: 
“Inadequate information and records would reduce the availability of evidence that is 
required for effective audit and oversight of the use of funds and could provide the 
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opportunity for leakages, corrupt procurement practices or use of resources in an 
unintended manner.” (ibid.) Without a good system for tracking public expenditures, it is 
hard to control whether expenditures reach planned destinations and make it more difficult 
to reveal abuses of public funds. (World Bank, 2003:184) According to Herbert (2007:274), it 
also decreases the overall accountability and transparency of public expenditures. Finally, a 
poor accounting system can result in poor assets management, which in turn might lead to 
increased costs and poorer service delivery (ibid.) 
C.iv Effective External Scrutiny and Audit   Effective scrutiny by the legislature and through 
external audit is according to the PEFA Secretariat (2011:68) vital for holding the 
government accountable for its fiscal- and expenditures policies and their implementation. 
Without the possibility to hold the government accountable, the value of services is likely to 
be diminished (ibid.) Campos and Pradhan (1996:9) similarly argue that limited scrutiny 
decreases pressure on the government to deliver what is promised in the expenditure plan. 
“Inadequate audit means that the accounting and use of funds is not subject to detailed 
review and verification.” (PEFA Secretariat, 2011:68) Poor auditing makes it more difficult for 
governments to hold itself accountable for how policymakers and providers spend public 
funds (World Bank, 2003:185). Decreased accountability of public officials could increase 
corruption in the public sector and deteriorate the efficiency of government service and 
programs (Peters, 2002:15). 
3.4 A Model of Public Spending Including PFM 
Having described the possible causal mechanisms in which the quality of the PFM system 
could have an impact on the efficiency of public spending, the model used in the empirical 
analysis is presented in this sub-chapter.  
Following the model used by Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002, public service outcome9 in 
program p and country i , is assumed to have the following production function:  
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9
 E.g. indicators of health status, such as child mortality, or education status, such as proportion of children 
completing primary education. 
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Written in natural logarithms: 
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PSpi is public spending on program p in country i, Ni is the population of country i, GDP is the 
gross domestic product, and A represents a set of country specific variables. The function 
indicates that public service outcome; improves with increased country income; improves, or 
does not deteriorates with increased public spending; and depend on country specific 
factors. 
As mentioned above, public spending does not always seems to be translated into efficient 
public services and positive outcomes. It could hence be assumed that only a fraction, β of 
public spending is used for-, or will contribute to productive purposes, and that the 
coefficient on public spending, β, on program p, can be written as: 
                 (3) 
 
Where βp is the productivity of public service created from the spending on program p and, 
      is a measure of the efficacy of public spending. In Rajkumar and Swaroop’s study (2008) 
assessing governance impact on public spending efficiency,      is defined as a function of 
state governance10. With the aim of assessing whether the quality of countries PFM system 
has an impact on public spending efficacy, it is here assumed that the efficiency of public 
spending is a function of the quality of the PFM system in country i as following: 
                       (4) 
 
Where PFMi is a measurement of the quality of the PFM system,     is the factor in which 
the quality of the PFM system affects public spending and     is country specific effects. An 
equation that is useful for the empirical model is received by inserting equation 3 and 4 into 
equation 2, which gives:  
             
 
          
    
  
                       
   
 
    
  (5) 
 
Public spending efficiency, measured as service outcomes, is thus assumed to depend up on 
countries’ income per capita, public spending as a share of country income, a set of country 
specific factors and the quality of the PFM system. By including the interaction term, 
                                                     
10
                 Where G is a measure of governance. (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002:6) 
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containing the quality of the PFM system and public spending, it is possible to analyze 
whether the quality of the PFM system affects the efficiency of public spending or not. 
4 Method 
4.1 The Model 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.2, both the PEFA assessments and the CPIA index 13 are suitable 
proxies for the quality of the PFM system. To take advantage of the two different set of data, 
allowing two estimations on health- and education outcomes respectively, four cross-
sectional OLS regressions are conducted. Cross-section estimations are the only method 
applicable on the set of data provided by the PEFA assessments. Data from the CPIA 
indicator 13 exists for 6 years and could hence be used in panel estimations. Yet, cross-
section estimations using averages from the time period are carried out for three reasons. 
The main reason is the lack of data, especially for the dependent variable, education 
attainment, but also for various control variables.11 The other two reasons are the short time 
period and the fact that little time-variation actually exists when assessing data for many of 
the key variables. However, in order to use the available data to the greatest extent, and as a 
means of controlling the cross-section method, a panel estimation is carried out with the 
Health-CPIA dataset. 
From the theoretical model showing the presumed public service production function 
(Equation 5 in Chapter 3.4), the empirical estimation for health- and education outcomes are 
specified as follows: 
                                                                
             (6) 
 
                                                                
              (7) 
 
The variables for country i are: HS - health status measured as the rate of child (under-5) 
mortality: ES - education status measured as expected primary completion rate: PCGDP - per 
capita GDP measured in purchasing power parity adjusted dollars; PHSGDP and PESGDP - 
                                                     
11
 Such as public spending, female education, adult education, income inequality. 
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public health- and education spending as a share of GDP: PFM - the quality of the PFM 
system measured through the PEFA assessments or CPIA indicator 13: X - a vector of 
country-specific socioeconomic variables: ɛ - an error term. 
In order to capture both direct- and indirect effects from the quality of the PFM system, the 
PFM variable enters into the model both as an independent variable and interacted with 
public spending as a share of GDP. One can question whether there is a direct link between 
the quality of the PFM system and health- and education outcomes, as no related literature 
indicates that a direct link exists. Yet, it is possible that the PFM variable picks up variation in 
the dependent variable caused by the quality of the countries’ institutions in general. An 
indication of this is that the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index, measuring the 
quality of countries institutions,12 and the CPIA index has a correlation coefficient of 0.56 
and the PEFA assessments 0.36. Including an individual variable for PFM quality might hence 
pick up effects from the quality of countries’ institutions in a broader sense than the PFM 
system. 
The prediction, from the theoretical point of view, is that the quality of the PFM system has 
a positive effect on the efficiency of public spending, and thus that the interaction term (and 
β4) will have a positive coefficient. It is important to be aware of that interpreting 
coefficients in a regression including an interaction term is different than in an additive 
model. The usage of interaction terms has been criticized for various reasons, e.g. that 
coefficients become more difficult to interpret and that estimates become sensitive to the 
specific set of data. Yet, Fredrich argues that the inclusion of a multiplicative term can 
increase accuracy, provide a more detailed analysis and also increase explanatory power. He 
therefore advocates for the inclusion of interactive terms if appropriate. (Fredrich, 1987: 
798f, 803f, 832) Since the aim of this study is to analyze the interaction between the quality 
of PFM system and the efficacy of public spending, the multiplicative model is used despite 
its drawbacks. Yet, it is important to consider them when analyzing the results, especially 
sensitivity to data since relatively small samples are used. As for the interpretation of the 
marginal effect, it is important to have in mind the difference from coefficients from 
                                                     
12
 The International Country Risk Guide’s indicator of quality of government includes, Corruption, Law and 
Order, and Bureaucracy Quality. It is scaled from 0 to 1 and higher values indicate higher quality of 
government. 
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additative variables,13 and that the marginal effect of public spending depends not only on 
the level of spending but also on the quality of the PFM system.14  
4.2 Limitations 
According to Jutting (2003:19), there is a general consensus among experts that institutions 
tend to be endogenous to development outcomes. It is possible that reverse causality exists 
between the main variables in the regressions, and that public service outcomes and public 
spending and/or the quality of the PFM system are jointly determined. An example of a 
possible way for the dependent variable to effect quantity of public spending is that it is 
likely that governments in countries with high child mortality devote a larger share of public 
spending on health in order to reduce mortality. The same reasoning can be made for 
education attainment. This could result in a negative or small regression coefficient for 
public spending, despite a positive impact on service outcomes. (Filmer and Pritchett, 
1999:1313) In order to address the problem with reverse causality, many are using 
instrumental variables15 (IVs) and 2SLS estimations instead of OLS (see Filmer and Pritchett, 
1999; Gupta et al. 1999; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008). However, Rajkumar and Swaroop 
argue that the OLS method is a valid tool which reveals how the key variables are correlated, 
irrespective causality. Moreover, they argue that there is no reason to believe that results 
are biased due to endogeneity. (2008:107f) Thus, and despite the risk of endogeneity, it is 
presumed that normal OLS estimations are sufficient as a first attempt to assess the link 
between the PFM system and public spending efficiency. 
5 Data 
Variables and data are chosen on the basis of availability in order to get the most 
comprehensive set of data possible. Moreover, in order to make results comparable, 
variables used in previous research are used when feasible. Appendix B presents all variables 
                                                     
13
 The marginal effect of public spending on health status is given by; δln(HSit)/ δln(PHSGDP)it= β2+ β4PFMit; 
and for education status by; δln(ESit)/ δln(PESGDP)it= β2+ β4PFMit. 
14
 Based on Fredrich’s (1982:810) discussion, a confidence interval for this marginal effect can be calculated as 
following: VAR[β2+ β4PFMit]=VAR[β2]+ PFMit2VAR[β4]+2 PFMitCOV[β2, β4]. This confidence interval shows 
whether the marginal effect of public spending is statistically significant at various qualities of PFM systems. 
The effect of public spending could thus be significant at some values of the PFM variable and insignificant at 
others. See Fredrich (1982) for further discussion. 
15
 Filmer and Pritchett (1999) use country neighbors’ public spending and Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) use 
country laws as IVs. 
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together with the source, and countries included in the regressions are listed in Appendix C. 
Countries included are low- or middle income countries since no high income countries are 
included in the PEFA assessment (except for Norway which is excluded in the sample) or the 
CPIA index. A common problem when conducting studies including these countries is 
availability of data, which also is a major problem in this analysis as it results in small sample 
sizes. A summary of the statistics on the dependent and the main explanatory variables can 
be seen in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1: Summary statistics on main variables 
Variables Max Min Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Regression Health-PEFA           
Under 5 mortality  185.40  10.10  70.40  49.23 37 
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted 2005$)  12918.58  303.19  3772.28  3406.46 37 
Public health spending (share of GDP)  7.45  0.76  2.95  1.50 37 
Quality of PFM system (PEFA)  5.14  1.25  3.05  0.92 37 
Regression Health-CPIA           
Under 5 mortality  185.57  13.87  92.24  44.62 37 
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted 2005$)  4326.74  301.02  1787.85  1085.28 37 
Public health spending (share of GDP)  4.95  0.74  2.51  1.14 37 
Quality of PFM system (CPIA)  4.21  2.14  3.34  0.54 37 
Regression Education-PEFA           
Education attainment  103.46  42.39  80.20  14.83 34 
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted 2005$)  24150.88  303.19  3894.26  4683.96 34 
Public health spending (share of GDP)  4.61  0.63  1.98  0.92 34 
Quality of PFM system (PEFA)  4.54  1.25  3.02  0.87 34 
Regression Education-CPIA           
Education attainment  103.73  30.26  72.34  16.13 37 
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted 2005$)  4665.85  301.02  1856.61  1257.00 37 
Public health spending (share of GDP)  5.51  0.58  2.06  1.14 37 
Quality of PFM system (CPIA)  4.21  1.79  1.79  0.59 37 
The PEFA regressions The data for the PEFA regressions consists of 37 observations for 
the health regression and 34 for the education. The PEFA assessments are conducted in 
different years, with the start in 2005, and data for the dependent- and explanatory 
variables are based on the same year as the PEFA assessment. 
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Due to lack of data, means of available data from two years before- and two years after the 
year of the PEFA assessment are used for the control variables female education and income 
inequality in the health regressions. In the education regressions, means are calculated and 
used for the dependent variable, education attainment, and the control variables public 
primary education spending, private primary education spending, adult literacy, and income 
inequality.16 Using means might cause measurement errors which should be held in mind 
when drawing conclusion from the results. 
Nine PEFA assessments exists for 2011, five of them are repeated assessments, meaning that 
that five countries already have an observation from a previous year. Since means are used 
for some variables, calculated with data from two years before and after the PEFA 
assessment, including data from 2011 is not be possible due to lack of data from 2013. 
Moreover, there are many missing observations for 2011 for various variables.17 Therefore, 
the nine observations from 2011 are dropped and the data set thus include observations 
from the time period 2005-2010. One could question whether there might be any time 
effects since the observations not are from the same year. Being aware of this shortcoming, 
it is overseen due to the relatively short period of time.18 
The CPIA regressions   The data used for the CPIA regressions consists of 37 observations for 
both the health- and education regression. For each variable, means from the time period 
2005-2010 are used. 19  The CPIA assessments are available from 2005 and for each year until 
2011. Yet, data is only used up until 2010 due to scarcity of data for other variables, and in 
order to use the same set of data as in the cross-section analysis.  As mentioned above, 
some data is scarce, especially for education attainment, education spending, and for some 
control variables. The means could thus be misleading and cause measurement errors. 
However, one can assume that variables change relatively little due to the short time period.  
                                                     
16
 The decision to calculate means with two years before and after the PEFA assessment was based on that 
many observations should have been excluded if more years should have been used. If the mean would have 
been calculated with three years before the PEFA observation, all years from 2010 should have been excluded 
since data from 2013 not is available yet. 
17
 Water, Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, Income inequality, Female and Adult education. 
18
 One possible time effect could be the economic crisis in the end of the 21
st
 century. However, the crisis hit 
the high income countries the worst, i.e., not the countries included in the analysis. 
19
 The first CPIAs are from 2005 and assessments are available for each year until 2011. Yet, data is only used 
up until 2010 in order to use the same set of data as in the cross-section analysis.   
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5.1 Dependent Variables 
Health   According to Filmer and Pritchett (1999:1309), infant- and child (under-5) mortality 
are the most commonly used indicators of health status (see e.g. Gupta et al., 1999; and 
Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008). In this study, health status is proxied as child (under-5) 
mortality which reveals how many new born babies out of 1000 that will die before reaching 
the age of 5 years, if subjected to current age-specific mortality rates. The data is obtained 
from the World Bank’s WDI. There is no indication in previous literature on which indicator is 
the most suitable assessing public spending efficiency. In order to control if using infant 
mortality changes the results, a control regression is run with this as the dependent variable.  
Education   Commonly used measures for education status are enrollment rates and 
education attainment. Rajkumar and Swaroop define the later as the number of school-aged 
children that enter and complete school or a specific grade. They argue that education 
attainment is a superior measurement since enrollment rates do not take drop-out rates into 
consideration. Further, education attainment tends to has an inverse relationship with drop-
out rates which indicate low education quality. (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008:102) 
According to the World Bank, low primary school completion indicates low enrollment rates, 
high drop-out rates, and low educational progress, and is thus a good indicator on failures of 
the education system (2003:111). On the basis of the discussion above, education 
attainment is proxied as the expected primary completion rate. Data on education status is 
gathered from WDI, but origin from UNESCO Institute for Statistics.  The expected primary 
completion rate is measured as;  
“the total number of new entrants to the first grade of primary in a given year, regardless of age, who 
are expected to reach the last grade of primary education, regardless of repetition, expressed as a 
percentage of the population at the official entrance age to primary education in the same year. It is 
calculated by multiplying the gross intake ratio to the first grade of primary education by the survival 
rate to the last grade of primary.” (World Bank, 2013)  
Since some students repeat grades or return to school after dropping out, the index might 
overstate education status, and it is possible that the ratio is above 1.0  (Barro and Lee, 
1996: 218f). 
5.2 Explanatory Variables 
The quality of the PFM System   Two variables are used as proxies for the quality of the PFM 
system, the PEFA assessments and the CPIA indicator 13. Since the CPIA index 13 is based 
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upon the PEFA framework, there are large similarities between the two indexes, see 
Appendix A for deeper description and comparison. The correlation between the data of the 
two variables existing for the same country and year is 0.755. The PEFAs offer more 
comprehensive assessments while the CPIAs provide a larger set of data. As mentioned, in 
order to get a more robust and comprehensive insight in the link between the quality of PFM 
system and public service efficiency, both indexes are used in this study. 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability – PEFA   The PEFA framework, initiated by 
the World Bank together with other actors20 in 2001, is now an internationally accepted and 
standardized tool to get reliable information on the performance of countries PFM systems. 
(PEFA Secretariat, n.a.) The framework provides a comprehensive method to assess 
countries’ PFM systems, it is applicable to all countries, and includes a broad set of indicators 
covering wide aspects of the PFM system. (de Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007:7, 21)  
As mentioned in Chapter 3.2, the PEFA assessments are divided into three sub-groups, 
consisting of 28 Performance Indicators (PIs) all together. The PIs are given a score from A-D 
(including D+, C+ and B+), where A indicates highest performance. The letter scores are 
transformed into numbers where higher scores denote better performance (D=0 and A=6).21 
Thereafter, the means of the 28 PIs are calculated where all PIs are given the same weight. 
Data is collected from the PEFA Secretariat, only finalized public assessments are included. 
Although the PEFA assessments today provide a large set of data useful in quantitative 
studies, the PEFAs were not meant be used in cross-country comparisons (de Renzio, 
2009:2). Even if the same methodology for the PEFA assessments is used, it is still a risk that 
they are carried out in different ways and subjectivity can cause differences in the scoring of 
indicators (Wescott, 2008:46). Another problem relates to missing scores for some PIs, 
which can result in biased means (Eckardt and Schickinger, 2010:14). Nevertheless, average 
values for country PEFA scores have been used in many reports and studies. de Renzio et al. 
(2011:10) argue that missing observations is not a serious measurement problem and 
according to them, countries with more missing scores are not significantly different in any 
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 IMF, DIFID, MAEE, Norad and SECO 
21
 According to the PEFA Secretariat (2009:6), this technique is increasingly being used in PEFA assessment 
reports and is also used in various PFM studies, e.g., de Renzio, 2009 and de Renzio et al., 2011. 
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noticeable ways. Finally, for a PEFA mean to truly reflect the PFM quality in a good way, all 
PIs should ideally be equally important. Yet, this is not the reality since some indicators 
might be more important than others, and importance might differ between countries. (de 
Renzio, 2009:3)  
de Renzio (2009:3f) argues that, while recognizing its limitations and problems, the PEFA 
assessments methodology ensures that quantitative cross-country comparisons can be 
feasible in most cases. The assumption taken is that the limitations and possible 
measurement errors have to be considered and that caution has to be taken drawing 
generalizing conclusions, but that the PEFA assessments do provide a feasible set of data 
useful for the aim of this thesis. 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessments – CPIA   Another interesting set of data over 
countries’ PFM systems is found in the World Bank’s annual CPIA index. It includes 16 criteria 
assessing the quality of countries policy- and institutional framework considered important 
for fostering growth and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2012a; World Bank, 2010a). The 
13th criteria assess the quality of budgetary- and fiscal management. It consists of three 
PFM dimensions; the comprehensiveness and credibility of the budget; the effectiveness of 
the PFM system; and the timeliness and accuracy of accounting and fiscal reporting (see 
Appendix A for further description). Criteria 13 use the PEFA index, IMF Code of Good 
Practices on Fiscal Transparency22 and the PRMPS Governance Indicators23 as guideposts. 
(World Bank, 2010a:3, 13)  
The CPIA indicator 13 ranks countries on a six-point scale where 6 indicates a good 
performance. Intermediate scores, 1.5-5.5, are also given. The three dimensions included in 
indicator 13 are scored separately and are given equal weight in the overall rating of the 
indicator. Data is gathered from the World Bank’s IDA Resource Allocation Index. 
Since the CPIA indicator 13 is based upon the PEFA methodology, the same problems are 
present for this set of data. Further downsides with the CPIA indicator 13 are that it is not as 
detailed as the PEFA index. Moreover, the problem with subjectivity in the score settings 
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 See: http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htm 
23
 See: http://go.worldbank.org/MFAH3FKZ20 
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might be even more severe for the CPIA indicator as it might be affected by lending decisions 
(de Renzio et al., 2011:7). However, the CPIA indicator 13, as the PEFA assessments, is 
considered to be a valid proxy for PFM quality in this study. 
Public spending   According to Lopez (2002:1), the three most commonly used indicators for 
public spending are; in per captia terms; as a share of GDP; and as a share of total 
government spending. Public spending as a share of GDP is used by various previous studies, 
e.g. Filmer and Pritchett (1999), and Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), and is also used in this 
analysis to make results comparable.  
Data on public spending, defined as recurrent and capital spending from central- and local 
government budgets, external borrowing and grants, is used from the World Bank’s WDI. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, public expenditures are argued to reduce poverty to a larger extent 
if they are spent on primary education- and health care. Data for public expenditures on 
primary education exists and is used in the analysis. However, data on primary health care is 
not fund and instead, data on health care as a whole is used. Lopez (2002:5) mentions 
problems with reliability of data as many low income countries may omit or misreport 
spending and since budgetary reporting standards can vary between nations. 
5.3 Control Variables 
A variety of socio-economic factors are assumed to affect countries’ health- and education 
status. Control variables used in the regressions are standard in related literature24. As 
mentioned above, Appendix B provides definitions and sources of all included variables. 
The positive relationship between national income and health- and education status is 
confirmed by various studies and is according to Filmer and Prichett (1999:1311) universally 
acknowledged. Also income distribution is assumed to effect health- and education status 
(ibid; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008:103), and is thus important to control for. A control 
variable for income distribution, using data on the Gini-coefficient, is included for the two 
health regressions. Due to the scarcity of data, the sample sizes decrease25 when including 
this control variable. Robustness controls are therefore made excluding income distribution 
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 See Filmer and Pritchett, 1999; Gupta et al,. 1999; La Porta et al, 1999; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008:101. 
25
  Including a control variable for income distribution decreases the sample size with 18 observations in the 
PEFA-Health sample and with 17 observations for the CPIA-Health sample. 
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in order to see whether the loss of data changes the results. As for the education 
regressions, the lack of data reduces the sample size below 3026 when income distribution is 
included and the variable is therefore dropped. 
Gupta et al. (1999:8) and Wilhelm and Fiestas (2005: 22) argue that not only public, but also 
private spending is likely to affect health- and education outcomes. Data on private spending 
on education is too scarce and cannot be included in the estimations. However, data on 
private health spending exists and is thus included in the two health regressions. 
Variables regarding parental education are often included as control variables in research 
related to health- and education status. Female education has appeared to be an important 
factor explaining child mortality (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999:1311), and female literacy is 
therefore included in the health regressions. However, due to lack of data, including this 
variable decreases the sample27 and a robustness check is therefore made where female 
literacy is excluded. Regarding education status, home background accounts for a large 
share of the variation in learning outcomes according to the World Bank (2003:119). Adult 
literacy is thus included in the education regressions. Data on adult literacy is rather scarce28 
and the variable is therefore dropped in a robustness control in order to see whether a 
larger sample will provide different results. 
The percentage of muslim population and the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization are 
widely used variables in both health- and education studies29 and are thus included in the 
health- as well as the education regressions. Two extra control variables are included in the 
health regressions, access to safe water and the distance from the equator, both assumed to 
be important factors affecting child health. (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999:1312; Leipziger et al., 
2003 in Wilhelm and Fiestas, 2055 6; and Gupta et al., 1999:7f). 
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  Observations for the PEFA-Education sample is 23 if income distribution is included and 29 for the CPIA-
Education.  
27
 Including a control variable for female literacy decreases the sample size with 13 observations in the PEFA-
Health sample and with 5 observations for the CPIA-Health sample. 
28
 Including a control variable for adult literacy decreases the sample size with 1 observations in the PEFA-
Education sample and with 11 observations for the CPIA-Education sample. 
29
 See La Porta et al., 1999:263; Caldwell (1986) in Filmer and Pritchett, 1999:1312; Easterly and Levine (1996) 
in Filmer and Pritchett 1999:1312; Schults (2003) in Gupta et al,. 1999:8 
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There are other variables that might have been suitable to include in the analysis, such as a 
demographic factors and the degree of urbanization. The main reason for why they are not 
included is shortage of data and problems with multicollinearity. 
6 Results 
To make sure that multicollinearity does not exist between variables, the correlation 
between all included variables are calculated and presented in Appendix D. Rather high 
correlations exist between income per capita and female education, adult literacy rate and 
access to safe water.30 According to Westerlund (2005:160f), a rule of thumb is to not allow 
correlation higher than 0.8. The correlation between income per capita and the other 
mentioned variables should thus not be high enough to cause any problems. Moreover, 
multicollinearity does only increase uncertainty around the affected coefficients while the 
variances of other variables stay the same (Wooldridge 2009:98-99). As income per capita, 
female education, adult literacy rate and access to safe water only are control variables, and 
the correlations are below 0.8, they are included as control variables. Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey and Whites tests are performed to check for heteroskedasticity, and Breusch-
Godfrey LM tests are performed to control for autocorrelation. As none seem to be present, 
normal standard errors are used in all regressions. The results from the four OLS regressions 
are presented in Table 6.1 below. 
Health Regressions   Note, a negative coefficient indicates a positive relationship with 
service outcome, as it implies a decrease in child mortality. The results give no evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that the quality of the PFM system affects efficiency of public 
spending. The interaction term, as well as the independent PFM- and public spending 
variable is insignificant in both regressions. The sign of the coefficients for public spending 
and the interaction term differ in the PEFA- and CPIA regressions. The coefficient for the 
interaction term is negative in the CPIA regression which is in line with the hypothesis, but is 
positive in the PEFA regression. As for public spending, the coefficient is negative in the PEFA 
regression and positive in the CPIA. In both regressions, the coefficient for PFM quality is  
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 Income per capita and female education in the Health-PEFA regression (0.613); income per capita and access 
to safe water in the Health-CPIA regression (0.633); and income per capita and adult literacy in the Education-
PEFA regression (0.559) 
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Table 6.1: Regression results 
Dependent Variable→  Under-5 mortality (ln) Education attainment (ln) 
Independent Variable ↓ Regression →  Health PEFA Health CPIA Education PEFA Education CPIA 
GDP per capita in PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) -0.243** -0.251 0.061 -0.018 
 
(-2.520) (-1.650) (1.185) (-0.291) 
PFM quality (PEFA) -0.194 
 
-0.025 
 
 
(-1.142) 
 
(-0.360) 
 PFM quality (CPIA) 
 
-0.151 
 
0.249*** 
  
(-0.595) 
 
(2.777) 
Public spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.482 0.469 0.135 0.565 
 
(-1.054) (0.491) (0.565) (1.646) 
PFM quality (PEFA)*Public spending (ln) 0.133 
 
-0.036 
 
 
(0.894) 
 
(-0.400) 
 PFM quality (CPIA)*Public spending (ln) 
 
-0.111 
 
-0.181* 
  
(-0.394) 
 
(-1.739) 
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.138 0.211 
  
 
(1.054) (1.357) 
  Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.780*** 0.544** -0.078 -0.077 
 
(3.266) (2.553) (-0.684) (-0.650) 
Female education -0.010** -0.012** 
  
 
(-2.695) (-2.463) 
  Adult literacy rate 
  
0.006** 0.004 
   
(2.324) (1.517) 
Income inequality 0.012 0.013 
  
 
(1.412) (1.296) 
  Distance from the equator 0.103 0.450 
  
 
(0.168) (0.636) 
  Percentage of population Muslim 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(1.451) (0.583) (0.925) (-0.689) 
Access to safe water  -0.012** -0.003 
  
 
(-2.658) (-0.668) 
  Constant 6.850*** 6.376*** 3.526*** 3.370*** 
 
(7.870) (4.671) (12.589) (7.948) 
R
2
 0.906 0.806 0.513 0.485 
Number of observation 37 37 34 37 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.004 
Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
  
negative, revealing a direct negative, but insignificant, relationship between the quality of 
the PFM system and child mortality.  
Among the other regressors, results from both regressions show that ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization increases child mortality while female literacy decreases it, which is in line 
with theory and results from related literature. The coefficients for income per capita are 
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negative in both regressions, as expected since income is assumed to be one of the main 
factors affecting child mortality. The coefficient is significant at the 5% level in the PEFA 
regression, but insignificant in the CPIA. The explanation might be that the effect from 
income per capita is picked up by some of the other regressors. Furthermore, the results 
show that access to safe water is significantly and negatively related to child mortality in the 
PEFA regression. The R-squared values are high, 0.91 for the PEFA regression and 0.81 for 
the CPIA regression. This is probably caused by overfitting, which generally occurs when a 
model have many parameters in relation to numbers of observations, which is the case here. 
Education Regressions   In the opposite of the health regressions, a negative coefficient is 
indicating a negative relationship with service outcome, as it implies a decrease in education 
attainment. The hypothesis is not verified in the education regressions either. Instead, the 
interaction term is negative in both regressions and is significant at the 10% level in the CPIA 
estimation. So this result goes against the hypothesis as it imply that the quality of the PFM 
system actually has a negative effect on public spending efficiency, since public spending 
interacted with PFM quality here seems to decrease education attainment. 
The public spending coefficient is positive but insignificant in both regressions. The PFM 
coefficient is negative and insignificant in the PEFA regression while it in the CPIA regression 
is positively correlated to education attainment at the 1% significant level. This indicates that 
the quality of the PFM system has a direct positive effect on education outcomes. In the 
opposite of the health regressions, income per capita is not significant and the coefficients, 
positive as expected from theory in the PEFA regression, and negative in the CPIA regression, 
are very small. As for the other control variables, adult literacy in the PEFA estimation is 
significantly and positively related to education attainment.  
6.1 Robustness Control 
In order to test the robustness of the results, nine different specifications are tested and also 
regressions where outliners and geographical regions are excluded from the sample. The 
results are found in Appendix E and F respectively. Regarding the robustness of the main 
specifications, there are no signs of redundant or omitted variables in the four main 
regressions. However, the Ramsey RESET-test for the Health-CPIA- and the Education-CPIA 
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regressions show sign of misspecification.31 For the later, excluding the independent PFM 
variable and dropping an education attainment outliner from the sample, makes the sign of 
misspecification disappear, but they persist for the Health-CPIA regression throughout the 
robustness controls. 
Non-linearity   The relationship between the dependent variable and public spending is 
assumed to be linear. According to Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008:107), it is however possible 
that the true relationship can take another, non-linear, form. If this is the case, the public 
spending variable and the interaction term might capture the non-linear effect of public 
spending. In order to test for omitted non-linearity, squared terms of the spending variable 
are included in the regressions. The results are presented in Appendix E, Table E.1. The 
included squared public spending coefficients are all insignificant, indicating that the 
relationship between public spending and service outcomes is linear as assumed. Moreover, 
adding the variable did not change the results significantly in any of the four regressions. 
Lagged public spending   It is arguable that health- and education status not only are 
affected by spending undertaken in the same year, but also in previous years (Rajkumar and 
Swaroop, 2008:99). In order to control for lagged public spending effects, lags from up to 
five years are included in the health regressions. Data on public education spending is scarce 
and it is thus not possible to control for lagged education spending effects. By including 
spending for 5 years back in time, all public health spending that could have affected the age 
group 0-5 is included. For the PEFA regressions, each lag is added one by one in five different 
regressions. For the CPIA regression, on lag is included with the mean of public spending 
undertaken between 2000-2004. The results from the regressions are presented in Appendix 
E, Table E.2. 
The lagged spending variable in the CPIA regression is positive but insignificant and the 
inclusion of the variable does not change the results to a great extent. In the PEFA 
regression, the sign of the lagged spending variable varies and is negative and positive every 
other year. Moreover, the lag from 2 years back, when 2 lags are included, is significantly 
and positively correlated with child mortality. Also lags from 4 and 5 years back, when 5 lags 
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 The F-statistics for the Ramsey RESET-test in the Health-CPIA estimation is 5.51 and in the Education-CPIA 
estimation it is 6.00 compared with the critical value of 4.26. 
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are included, are significant, the 4th lag with a positive- and the 5th with a negative 
coefficient. Turning to the other variables, when lagged spending for 5 years is included, 
PFM quality becomes significant at the 5% level and public spending becomes significant on 
the 10% level, both with a negative sign. Yet the interaction term stays the same, positive 
and insignificant in all five regressions. Overall, it is hard to draw any general conclusions 
from the varying results around whether public spending lags should be included or not. 
However, since the main variable, the interaction term, is unaffected when lags are included, 
the main regressions is assumed to be robust in this perspective. 
Infant mortality   Another common measure of health status is infant (under-1) mortality. 
Infant mortality is therefore used as dependent variable as a means to check the robustness 
of the results from the health regressions. The results are found in Appendix E, Table E.3. 
The results from the regressions are very similar to the ones in the main regressions. Child 
(under-5) mortality can thus be regarded as an adequate dependent variable in the health 
estimations. 
Excluding the PFM as an individual variable   The reasoning behind including the PFM 
variable as an independent variable is explained in Chapter 4.1. However, it is not a rule of 
thumb to include the variables in interaction terms as individual variables. Therefore, and 
since no literature suggesting a direct effect between the quality of the PFM system and 
public spending efficiency is found, regressions are made excluding the individual PFM 
variable. The results are presented in Appendix E, Table E.4. 
For the PEFA regressions, excluding the individual PFM variable did not change the results 
noteworthy. The only thing worth mentioning is that the interaction term turned negative in 
the Health-PEFA estimation, but the correlation is still insignificant. The results change more 
in the CPIA estimations. In the Education-CPIA regression, the interaction term, negatively 
and significantly related to education attainment in the main regression, turned insignificant 
and positive. Moreover, when performing a RESET-test, there is no longer a sign of 
misspecification32 which exists in the main regression. It is therefore questionable whether it 
is correct to include the individual PFM variable in the Education-CPIA regression.  
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 The F-value for the RESET-test is 0.21 compared to the critical value 4.26. 
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In the Health-CPIA estimation, the coefficient signs did not change for any of the variables. 
But income per capita, public spending, the interaction term, and income inequality turned 
significant at the 10% level from not being significant in the main estimation. The rise of the 
t-value for the public spending variable is hard to understand. However, the rise of the t-
value for the interaction term might be caused by that the interaction term also picks up the 
direct effect from the PFM variable that is excluded. This might thus be a sign that the 
individual PFM variable should be included in the regression. What is rather puzzling is that 
this did not happen in the other regressions, and also, there are still signs of misspecification 
as in the main Health-PEFA regression33. The overall conclusion, due to small changes in the 
results, and to not overlook a possible direct relationship between the quality of the PFM 
system and service outcome, is that it is preferable to include an individual PFM variable. 
Excluding variables in order to get larger sample sizes 
Health regressions   Many observations are missing for female literacy and income 
inequality which reduce the sample size substantially in the health regressions. In order to 
test the estimations with larger sample sizes, regressions are made without these variables, 
both individually and jointly, i.e., three test regressions are made for both the PEFA and the 
CPIA regression34. See Appendix E, Table E.5 and E.6 for results. 
In the PEFA regressions, the results stay rather unchanged, but some changes occur in the 
CPIA regressions. The PFM variable, insignificant in the main regression, turns significant in 
both estimations where income inequality is excluded. The coefficients are still negative as in 
the main regressions, indicating that the quality of the PFM system has a direct negative 
effect on child mortality. The coefficient for public spending, positive in the main regression, 
becomes negative when dropping female literacy, and the correlation turns significant at the 
10% level when both female literacy and income inequality are excluded. The interaction 
term, negative in the main regression, turned positive in all three control regressions, and it 
becomes significant when both female literacy and income inequality are excluded. Hence, 
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 The F-value for the RESET-test is 5.43 compared to the critical value 4.26. 
34
 The sample size in the main Health-PEFA regression is 37, and the sample size is; 48 excluding female literacy; 
55 excluding income inequality; and 78 excluding both variables.  
The sample size in the main Health-CPIA regression is 37, and the sample size is; 38 excluding female literacy; 
54 excluding income inequality; and 61 excluding both variables. 
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this result goes against the hypothesis as it shows that the quality of the PFM system 
decrease efficiency of public spending. 
Education regressions   To test the education estimations on larger sample sizes, regressions 
excluding the control variable for adult literacy are conducted.35 The results are presented in 
Appendix E, Table E.7. Excluding adult literacy did not change the results to a great extent. 
The changes worth mentioning are that the coefficient for PFM quality turns positive, but yet 
insignificant, in the Education-PEFA estimation. As for the Education-CPIA regression, public 
spending becomes positively significant, and the interaction term becomes significant at the 
5% level in comparison to the 10% level in the main regression. 
Looking on both the health- and education regressions, the CPIA regressions with larger 
sample sizes strengthen the indication that PFM quality may have a positive direct effect on 
service outcomes, which were implied in the main Education-CPIA regression. As for the 
interaction term, the coefficient turned positive and significant when both female literacy 
and income inequality are excluded in the Health-CPIA regression. This further demolishes 
the hypothesis that the PFM quality enhances public spending efficiency, as in the 
Education-CPIA regression. However, since the results in the CPIA estimations vary a lot, it is 
not suitable to draw any conclusions from this. 
Panel regression   As mentioned in Chapter 4.1, the data used in the Health-CPIA regression 
could also be used in a panel estimation, which is conducted as a means of robustness 
control. The random effects panel estimation includes data from 2005-2010 including 222 
observations. The results are found in Appendix E, Table E.8. 
There are some noteworthy differences between the cross-section and the panel estimation. 
First, the R-squared term decreases significantly and the model only explain 60% of the 
variance in child mortality in the panel estimation compared to 81% in the cross-section. This 
confirms the assumed problem with overfitting. The coefficient for the PFM variable turns 
positive, while the coefficient for public spending turns negative, opposite to the main 
regressions, but both are still insignificant. The interaction term is unchanged, still negative 
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 The sample size in the main Education-PEFA regression is 34, and the sample size is 47 excluding adult 
literacy. 
The sample size in the main Education-CPIA regression is 37, and the sample size is 42 excluding adult literacy. 
33 
 
and insignificant. Hence, the result from the panel estimation does not shed any further light 
over whether the quality of the PFM system has an impact on public spending efficiency. 
Outliers In order to control for the possibility that a few, relatively high- or low observations 
for some variables bias the results, it is common to drop those observations from the 
sample. Outliers are found for the, PEFA assessments, CPIA index, and education attainment. 
Regressions are therefore conducted without theses outliers and the results are found in 
Appendix F, Table F.1. 
The result did not change much when excluding the PEFA- and CPIA outliers. But excluding 
the education outliner resulted in some changes. Excluding the outliner in the Education-
CPIA regression only change the results slightly. More interestingly, when performing a 
RESET-test, there is no longer a sign of misspecification as in the main regression.36 When 
excluding the outliner in the Education-PEFA estimation, public spending becomes positively 
significant at the 5% level from being insignificant in the main regression. Also the t-value for 
the interaction term increases remarkably so that the term becomes negatively significant. 
Yet again, contrary to the hypothesis, this result indicates that the quality of the PFM system 
has a negative effect on public spending efficiency. 
Split samples As mentioned in Chapter 3.2, the quality of the PFM system might be 
influenced by the countries historical-, political- and social heritage. In order to control for 
this, regressions with split samples are conducted excluding countries located in different 
geographical areas. The countries included in the study are from six geographical regions.37 
Since most of the countries included in the sample are from Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding 
this region makes the sample far too small. Also, excluding the other regions one by one 
means just dropping a few observations. Despite this, regressions with split samples are 
made and no large changes in the results occur in any of the estimations. A preferable 
method for future research might be to include regional dummies instead of using split 
samples. 
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 The F-value for the RESET-test is 0.06. 
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 The six regions included in the samples are; East Asia and the Pacific; Europe and Central Asia; Latin America 
and the Caribbean; Middle-East and North Africa; South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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7 Discussion 
This chapter provides an overview and a discussion of the main findings and elaborates on 
weaknesses in the method and data. Starting with the health regressions, the coefficient for 
the interaction term is positive38  in the PEFA regression and negative 39  in the CPIA 
regression, both insignificant. No conclusion whether the quality of the PFM system 
increases the efficiency of public health spending can hence be drawn. The general picture 
from the results for the individual PFM variable and public spending is that they both have a 
negative but insignificant effect on child mortality. Regarding the control variables, income 
per capita, female literacy and access to safe water decrease child mortality while ethno-
linguistic fractionalization increases it. 
The results are to some extent less ambiguous for the education regressions. The interaction 
term is negative in both the PEFA and CPIA regressions40, and is significant in the CPIA 
regression. The result from the CPIA regression reveals, in contrary to the hypothesis, that 
the quality of the PFM system has a negative effect on public education spending efficiency. 
For the independent PFM variable, the results from the PEFA regression consist of small and 
insignificant values. However, the PFM variable is significant in the CPIA regression, 
indicating that the quality of the PFM system have a positive direct effect on education 
outcomes. As for public spending, although it is positive in the PEFA- as well as the CPIA 
regression, the relationship is not significant. Regarding the control variables, adult literacy 
increases education attainment. 
The results from all regressions except the Health-CPIA regression are rather robust as the 
results from the main regressions are fairly stable throughout the robustness checks. Since 
the signs of misspecification in the Education-CPIA regression dispread when dropping the 
education attainment outlier, the results from that regression might be preferable. Yet, the 
results are rather similar so in this case, the main specification is considered appropriate. As 
for the Health-CPIA regression, the problem with misspecification persists throughout the 
robustness control. This is rather puzzling since a common model for child mortality is used, 
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 In the main regression as well as in all but two robustness controls, where the individual PFM variable is 
excluded and the regression with a larger sample size, where income inequality is excluded. 
39
 In the main regression as well as in all but three robustness controls, the ones with larger sample sizes. 
40
 The only estimations where the interaction term coefficient is positive are in the PEFA regression with a 
squared public spending term and the CPIA regression where the individual PFM variable is excluded. 
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and since the same model is used in the Health-PEFA regression which does not show signs 
of misspecification. The results from the Health-CPIA regression should hence be viewed 
upon with caution. 
The results from the Education-CPIA regression show that the quality of the PFM system has 
a direct positive effect on education attainment. Yet, this is not confirmed in the other 
regressions. There are no arguments found in related literature that the PFM system 
influences service outcomes (here health- and education status) except for through the 
efficiency of public spending. One possible explanation to why the PFM system could have a 
direct effect is that the variable might be an indicator for the quality of countries’ institutions 
overall, which seem to have an impact on health- and education status. If so, it might not be 
the quality of the PFM system per se, but the overall quality of the countries’ institutions 
that lies behind the direct positive relationship between the quality of the PFM system and 
education attainment in the Education-CPIA regression. 
Since the methodology of measuring the CPIA indicator 13 is based upon the methodology 
used in the PEFA assessments, the variables should be rather similar. This is confirmed as the 
variables correlation is rather high (0.76). Yet, the results differ to some extent between the 
PEFA- and the CPIA regressions. The actual difference in the methodology used for the PEFA- 
and CPIA index, as well as the methodology used in this study, using means from 2005-2010 
in the CPIA regressions, are likely factors causing the results to differ. Further, the results 
could be affected by which countries are included in the sample, especially since the sample 
sizes are small, and multiplicative methods are known to be sensitive to the set of data used. 
Regarding small sample sizes, it is well known that data is scarce for many low- and middle 
income countries. Conducting regressions with small samples is here assumed prior to not 
carry out the analysis at all. Larger sample sizes are however to prefer, and optimal would 
have been to perform panel- or time-series analysis in order to capture changes in time and 
get a more throughout analysis. The panel estimation made with the Health-CPIA data is an 
attempt to use all data available. Yet, it only includes six years which probably is a too short 
time period to capture relationships between factors that might change slowly. In summary 
regarding the data, the small sample sizes are probably the largest draw back in this study. 
Consequently, results need to be interpreted with caution. However, performing many 
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regressions, by using two different PFM variables and two different variables for public 
spending efficiency, is an attempt to compensate for the small sample sizes. 
An additional factor that should be mentioned is the choice of dependent variables. Child 
mortality and education attainment are variables widely used and accepted as proxies for 
health- and education status and public spending efficiency. However, there are many 
factors influencing health- and education status, and it is also likely that there are many 
factors affecting the efficiency of public spending. It is therefore possible that the influence 
from the quality of the PFM system on public service outcomes, through public spending, is 
rather small if it exists. It would thus be desirable to find dependent variables that are more 
closely related to public service efficiency than child mortality and education attainment. 
8 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the relationship between the quality of countries’ public 
financial management (PFM) system and public spending efficiency. The hypothesis is that 
the quality of the PFM system influences the efficiency of public spending positively, but this 
has yet not been analyzed empirically. 
The focus is directed towards pro-poor public spending, limited to the health- and primary 
education sector. Efficiency of spending is measured by child (under-5) mortality and 
education attainment respectively. Data from two new measurements of the quality of the 
PFM system, the PEFA assessments and the CPIA index 13, are interacted with public 
spending, resulting in four multiplicative cross-sectional OLS regressions. 
No support for the presumed relationship between the quality of PFM system and efficiency 
of public spending is found. The interaction term shows a negative relationship between the 
quality of the PFM system and public spending efficiency in all regressions except for the 
Health-CPIA regression. Moreover, the interaction term is insignificant in all but one of the 
four regressions, the Education-CPIA regression. In general, the control variables behave in 
line with theoretical expectations. Public spending is positively, but insignificantly, correlated 
with service outcomes. It is thus hard to draw any conclusions regarding whether public 
spending improves service delivery or not.  
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It might be possible that the PFM system’s importance for translating public spending into 
desired outcomes is overstated. Another possible explanation behind the ambiguous results 
might be that the effect of the quality of the PFM system on spending efficiency actually is 
too small on the health- and education indicators used. For further research it might 
therefore be preferred to use other dependent variables, measuring the efficiency of public 
spending more directly than child mortality and education attainment. Further, as 
mentioned throughout the thesis, scarcity of data is a major challenge for the robustness of 
the analysis. It reduces the sample sizes, decreases precision, and might cause measurement 
errors since means have to be calculated for some variables. Scarcity of data also limits the 
analysis to cross-section regressions although it is preferred to conduct panel- or time-series 
analysis. Since multiplicative regressions are said to be sensitive to the set of data, the small 
sample size is of extra concern.  
So, although the results show weak indications that the quality of the PFM system does not 
have, or even has a small negative effect on efficiency of public spending, the un-robustness 
of the results and the weaknesses in the study make it hard to draw any general conclusions. 
Looking at related literature revealing several presumed linkages between PFM and public 
spending efficiency, it is hard to believe that the quality of the PFM system does not have an 
effect on public spending efficiency. An advice is thus to continue to analyze the relation 
between the PFM system and public spending, with larger sets of data, carrying out panel- or 
time-series analysis, and using other dependent variables which are more closely related to 
public service efficiency and quality.  
The importance to continue to analyze this relationship should be emphasized. Public 
spending is an acknowledged tool for reducing poverty and promote development, but is 
however not always translated into desired outcomes. In order to make public spending pro-
poor and effective, it is therefore important to find out which factors that are influencing the 
efficiency of public spending. If the quality of the PFM system is proven to increase efficiency 
of public spending, it could be translated into important policy recommendations for 
reaching desired outcomes within the public sector. In the theoretical discussion, the 
importance of some aspects of the PFM system, such as transparency, are more frequently 
mentioned as important elements for public spending efficiency than others. It would hence 
be of interest to analyze different parts of the PFM system separately. This sort of analysis 
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could reveal which parts of the PFM system that are the most important to improve in order 
to increase public spending efficiency. Nevertheless, as stated, no clear conclusions or policy 
recommendations can be made in this thesis. Yet, the hope is that future research could 
reveal whether the quality of the PFM system is an important factor for increasing efficiency 
of pro-poor public spending, and could result in policy recommendations on how to translate 
public spending into effective public services. 
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Appendix A. The PEFA assessments and CPIA indicator 13 
 
Table A.1: Performance Indicators for the PEFA assessments 
  A. PFM-OUT-TURNS:  Credibility of the budget 
PI-1 Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget 
PI-2 Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget 
PI-3 Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved budget 
PI-4 Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears 
  B. KEY CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES: Comprehensiveness and Transparency 
PI-5 Classification of the budget 
PI-6 Comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation 
PI-7 Extent of unreported government operations 
PI-8 Transparency of inter-governmental fiscal relations 
PI-9 Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public sector entities. 
PI-10 Public access to key fiscal information 
  C. BUDGET CYCLE 
  C(i) Policy based Budgeting 
PI-11 Orderliness and participation in the annual budget process 
PI-12 Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting 
  C(ii) Predictability and Control in Budget Execution 
PI-13 Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities  
PI-14 Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax assessment 
PI-15 Effectiveness in collection of tax payments  
PI-16 Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures 
PI-17 Recording and management of cash balances, debt and guarantees 
PI-18 Effectiveness of payroll controls 
PI-19 Transparency, competition and complaints mechanisms in procurement (until 2010: competition, 
value for money and controls in procurement) 
PI-20 Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditure 
PI-21 Effectiveness of internal audit 
  C(iii) Accounting, Recording  and Reporting 
PI-22 Timeliness and regularity of  accounts reconciliation 
PI-23 Availability of information on resources received by service delivery units 
PI-24 Quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports 
PI-25 Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements 
  C(iv) External Scrutiny and Audit 
PI-26 Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit 
PI-27 Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law 
PI-28 Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports 
  D. DONOR PRACTICES 
D-1 Predictability of Direct Budget Support 
D-2 Financial information provided by donors for budgeting and reporting on project and program aid 
D-3 Proportion of aid that is managed by use of national procedures 
(PEFA, 2011:9) 
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Table A.2: Criteria for the 6 scores for the 3 categories of the CPIA indicator 13 
1  a If there is a budget, it is not a meaningful instrument, nor an indicator of policies or tool 
for allocation of public resources. There is no forward look in the budget, nor any 
meaningful consultation with spending ministries. No consistent budget classification 
system is used. More than 50 percent of public resources from all sources do not flow 
through the budget. 
 b Expenditures across broad budget categories have little or no relationship to the 
amounts budgeted. There is practically no monitoring and reporting of public 
expenditures. Payment arrears exceed 10% of total expenditures, or cannot be 
determined. 
 c There is no reconciliation of cash accounts with fiscal records. No regular, in-year fiscal 
reports are produced. Public accounts are seldom prepared, or are more than five years 
out of date. The use of public resources is not on the public agenda. 
2 a There is no discernible link with government policies or priorities, and no forward look in 
the budget. The budget is formulated without meaningful consultation with spending 
ministries. No consistent budget classification system is in use. Significant fiscal 
operations (e.g., extra-budgetary expenditures and donor funded projects of 25-50 
percent of total spending by value) are excluded from the budget. 
 b Actual expenditures often deviate significantly from the amounts budgeted (e.g., by 
more than 30 percent overall or on many broad budget categories). There is no 
adequate system of budget reporting and monitoring. Payments arrears exceed 10% of 
total expenditures. 
  c Reconciliation of banking and fiscal records is undertaken less frequently than monthly, 
and discrepancies are often left unexplained. In-year fiscal reports are largely useless, 
due to lengthy delays or inaccurate data. There are significant delays (more than three 
years) in the preparation of the public accounts. The accounts are not (professionally) 
audited or submitted to the legislature in a timely way, and no actions are taken on 
budget reports and audit findings. 
3 a Policies or priorities are explicit, but are not linked to the budget. There is no forward 
look in the budget. The budget is formulated in consultation with spending ministries 
The budget classification system does not provide an adequate picture of general 
government activities. A significant amount of funds controlled by the executive is 
outside the budget (e.g., 10-25%), and a number of donor activities bypass the budget. 
 b Expenditures deviate from the amounts budgeted by more than 20 percent overall, or 
on many broad budget categories. Budget monitoring and control systems are 
inadequate. Payment arrears are 5-10% of total expenditures. 
 c Reconciliation of banking and fiscal records is undertaken less frequently than monthly, 
or discrepancies are not always accounted for. In-year budget reports are prepared 
quarterly less than 8 weeks after the end of the period, but their usefulness is 
undermined somewhat by inaccurate data or reporting only at high levels of 
aggregation. There are significant delays (e.g., more than 10 months) in the preparation 
of public accounts. Accounts are not audited in a timely and adequate way, and few if 
any actions are taken on budget reports and audit findings. 
4 a Policies and priorities are broadly reflected in the budget. Some elements of forward 
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budget planning are in place. The budget is formulated in consultation with spending 
ministries, from a sufficiently early stage in the budget preparation process. The budget 
classification system is comprehensive, but different from international standards. Less 
than 10% of funds controlled by the executive are outside the budget. 
 b Actual expenditures deviate from the amounts budgeted by more than 10 percent on 
many broad budget categories. Budget monitoring and control systems exist, but there 
are some deficiencies. Payment arrears may exist but are less than 5% of total 
expenditures. 
 c Reconciliation of banking and fiscal records is undertaken satisfactorily, on a monthly 
basis. In-year budget reports are prepared quarterly less than 6 weeks after the end of 
the period, with reasonably accurate data, broken down to at least program or 
functional level. There are delays (e.g., more than 6 months) in preparation of the public 
accounts. The accounts are audited in a timely and professional manner, but few 
meaningful actions are taken on budget reports or audit findings. 
5 a  Policies and priorities are linked to the budget. Multi-year expenditure projections are 
integrated into the budget formulation process, and reflect explicit costing of the 
implications of new policy initiatives. The budget is formulated through systematic 
consultations with spending ministries and the legislature, adhering to a fixed budget 
calendar. The budget classification system is comprehensive and consistent with 
international standards Off-budget expenditures are minimal, and transparent. 
  b The budget is implemented as planned, and actual expenditures deviate only slightly 
from planned levels (by less than 10 percent on most broad categories). Budget 
monitoring occurs throughout the year based on well functioning management 
information systems. Payment arrears are negligible or non-existent. 
 c Reconciliation of banking and fiscal records is practiced comprehensively, properly, and 
in a timely way (daily or weekly). In-year fiscal reports are prepared at least quarterly, 
issued within 4 weeks of end of period, and provide accurate data on all budget items, 
with coverage of expenditures at both the commitment and payment stages. The public 
accounts are prepared within 6 months of the end of the fiscal year, and include full 
information on revenue, expenditure, and financial assets and liabilities. Accounts are 
audited in a timely, professional and comprehensive manner, and appropriate action is 
taken on budget reports and audit findings. 
6  Criteria for “5” on all three sub-ratings are fully met. In addition: 
 a Budget supporting documents are submitted to the legislature, with the annual budget, 
with information on macroeconomic assumptions, estimates of budgetary impact of 
major revenue and expenditure policy changes, and comparisons to previous budget 
outturns or estimated outturns. 
  b Funds available to spending agencies or ministries are highly predictable within the 
budget year. In-year adjustments are infrequent, follow pre-specified guidelines, and are 
consistent with stated priorities. 
 c The public has timely and inexpensive access to annual budget documentation, in-year 
and year-end reports, and external audit reports. 
(World Bank, 2010a:34f) 
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Appendix B. Data Appendix 
 
Table B.1: Data appendix 
Variable Description and Source 
Per-capita GDP (PPP) GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $). PPP GDP is gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. Data 
are in constant 2005 international dollars. Source: World Development Index (WDI) 
Child (under 5) mortality Child under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will 
die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Source: 
WDI 
Education attainment Expected primary completion rate. Total. The total number of new entrants to the 
first grade of primary in a given year, regardless of age, who are expected to reach 
the last grade of primary education, regardless of repetition, expressed as a 
percentage of the population at the official entrance age to primary education in the 
same year. It is calculated by multiplying the gross intake ratio to the first grade of 
primary education by the survival rate to the last grade of primary. Source: WDI 
(Original Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics) 
PFM quality – PEFA An average of 28 Performance Indicators assessing various important entities of the 
PFM System. Source: PEFA Secretariat 
PFM quality – CPIA indicator 13 The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (a) 
economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies for social inclusion and 
equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions. Criteria 13 measures 
Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management. Source: World Bank, International 
Development Association. 
Public health spending Health expenditure, private (% of GDP). Public health expenditure consists of 
recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, 
external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds. 
Source: WDI 
Private health spending Health expenditure, public (% of GDP). Private health expenditure includes direct 
household (out-of-pocket) spending, private insurance, charitable donations, and 
direct service payments by private corporations. Source: WDI 
Public primary education spending Total expenditure on educational institutions and administration as a % of GDP. 
Public sources. Primary. Total expenditure on educational institutions and 
administration as a % of GDP. Public sources. Primary is the expenditure coming 
from public sources spent on primary education expressed as a % of GDP. Source: 
WDI 
Private primary education spending Total expenditure on educational institutions and administration as a % of GDP. 
Private sources. Primary. Total expenditure on educational institutions and 
administration as a % of GDP. Private sources. Primary is the expenditure coming 
from private sources spent on primary education expressed as a % of GDP. Source: 
WDI 
Female education Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Female. Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Female is the 
percentage of females age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and 
write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, ‘literacy’ also 
encompasses ‘numeracy’, the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This 
indicator is calculated by dividing the number of female literates aged 15 years and 
over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100. 
Source: WDI (Original Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics). 
Adult literacy Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and 
above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on 
their everyday life. Generally, ‘literacy’ also encompasses ‘numeracy’, the ability to 
make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the 
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number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group 
population and multiplying the result by 100. Source: WDI (Original Source: UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics) 
Income inequality Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some 
cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the 
cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of 
recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index 
measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute 
equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini 
index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect 
inequality. Source: WDI 
Predominantly Muslim Muslims as percentage of population. Source: University of Gothenburg’s Quality of 
Government/QoG Standard Dataset. (Original sources: Barrett (1982), Worldmark 
Encyclopedia of the Nations (1995), Statistical Ab-stract of the World (1995), United 
Nations (1995) and CIA (1996)) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization Ranges from 0 to 1. Average values of 5 different indices, based on: (1) probability 
that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same 
ethnolinguistic group (index is based on the number and size of population groups as 
distinguished by their ethnic and linguistic status); (2) probability of two randomly 
selected individuals differing in their native language; (3) probability of two randomly 
selected individuals not speaking a common language; (4) probability of two 
randomly selected individuals not speaking the official language; and (5) the 
percentage of the population not speaking the most widely used language. Source: 
University of Gothenburg’s Quality of Government/QoG Standard Dataset. (Original 
Source: Easterly and Levine (1997)) 
Access to safe water Improved water source (% of population with access. Access to an improved water 
source refers to the percentage of the population with reasonable access to an 
adequate amount of water from an improved source, such as a household 
connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected well or spring, and rainwater 
collection. Unimproved sources include vendors, tanker trucks, and unprotected 
wells and springs. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20 liters 
a person a day from a source within one kilometer of the dwelling. Source: WDI 
(Original Source: World Health Organization and United Nations Children's Fund)  
Degree of urbanization Urban population (% of total). Urban population refers to people living in urban 
areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank 
population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization 
Prospects. Source: WDI 
Distance from the equator The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values 
between 0 and 1).  Source: University of Gothenburg’s Quality of Government/QoG 
Standard Dataset. (Original Source: La Porta et al. 1999) 
Infant (under 1) mortality Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, 
per 1,000 live births in a given year. Source: WDI. (Original source: Level & Trends in 
Child Mortality. Estimates Developed by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child 
Mortality Estimation (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UN DESA, UNPD)) 
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Appendix C.  Countries Used in Regressions 
 
Table C.1: Countries used in regressions 
Health-PEFA Health-CPIA Education-PEFA Education-CPIA 
Obs. 37 Obs. 37 Obs. 34 Obs. 37 
Albania Bangladesh Bangladesh Angola       
Bangladesh Bhutan Botswana Bangladesh 
Bolivia Bolivia Burkina Faso Bhutan 
Brazil Burkina Faso Burundi Bolivia 
Burkina Faso Burundi Cape Verde Burkina Faso 
Central African Rep. Cambodia Central African Rep. Burundi 
Colombia Cameroon Colombia Cambodia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Central African Rep. Congo, Dem. Rep. Cameroon 
Costa Rica Congo, Dem. Rep. Costa Rica Cape Verde   
Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire El Salvador Central African Rep. 
Dominican Rep.* Ethiopia Ghana Chad         
El Salvador Ghana Guatemala Comoros      
Ethiopia Guinea       Honduras Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Gabon Honduras Indonesia Ethiopia 
Honduras India Jordan Gambia, The 
Indonesia Kenya Kenya Ghana 
Jordan Lao, PDR Liberia Guinea       
Kenya Madagaskar Malawi Honduras 
Liberia Mali Mali India 
Mali Mauritania Mauritania Lao, PDR 
Mauritania Mongolia Morocco Lesotho      
Morocco Mozambique Mozambique Madagascar 
Mozambique Nepal Nicaragua Malawi 
Nepal Nicaragua Paraguay Mali 
Nicaragua Niger Peru Mauritania 
Pakistan Nigeria Philippines Mongolia 
Paraguay Pakistan Rwanda* Mozambique 
Peru Rwanda Tanzania Nicaragua 
Philippines Senegal Togo Niger 
Rwanda Sri Lanka Trinidad & Tobago Rwanda 
South Africa Sudan Tunisia Senegal 
Uganda** Tanzania Uganda Sri Lanka 
Zambia Togo         Vanuatu Tanzania 
 Uganda 
 
Togo         
 
Vietnam 
 
Uganda 
 
Yemen, Rep. 
 
Vanuatu      
 
Zambia 
 
Zambia 
* Used twice in the regression 
** Used three times in the regression 
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Appendix D. Correlation Matrix 
 
Table D.1: Correlation matrix, Health-PEFA 
  
U
n
d
er
-5
 m
o
rt
al
it
y 
(l
n
) 
P
er
 
ca
p
it
a 
G
D
P
 
(i
n
 
P
P
P
 
ad
ju
st
e
d
 2
0
0
5
$
) 
P
FM
 q
u
al
it
y 
(P
EF
A
) 
P
u
b
lic
 s
p
e
n
d
in
g 
as
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
G
D
P
 (
ln
) 
P
ri
va
te
 
h
ea
lt
h
 
sp
e
n
d
in
g 
as
 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
G
D
P
 (
ln
) 
Et
h
n
o
lin
gu
is
ti
c 
fr
ac
ti
o
n
al
iz
at
io
n
 
Fe
m
al
e 
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
In
co
m
e 
in
eq
u
al
it
y 
D
is
ta
n
ce
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
eq
u
at
o
r 
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 
o
f 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
M
u
sl
im
 
A
cc
es
s 
to
 s
af
e 
w
at
er
 
Under-5 mortality (ln) 1.000                     
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted 2005$) -0.621 1.000                   
PFM quality (PEFA) -0.514 0.488 1.000                 
Public spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.283 0.250 0.534 1.000               
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.093 -0.177 -0.040 0.120 1.000             
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.654 -0.313 -0.458 -0.548 0.114 1.000           
Female education -0.755 0.613 0.352 0.295 -0.033 -0.334 1.000         
Income inequality -0.147 0.346 0.394 0.403 0.075 -0.053 0.318 1.000       
Distance from the equator -0.324 0.167 0.237 -0.086 -0.266 -0.317 -0.025 -0.227 1.000     
Percentage of population Muslim 0.161 -0.252 -0.070 -0.243 -0.240 -0.127 -0.470 -0.604 0.465 1.000   
Access to safe water -0.689 0.404 0.311 0.130 0.114 -0.507 0.363 0.004 0.461 0.025 1.000 
 
Table D.2: Correlation matrix, Health-CPIA 
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Under-5 mortality (ln) 1.000                     
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted 2005$) -0.683 1.000                   
PFM quality (CPIA) -0.419 0.346 1.000                 
Public spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.044 0.068 0.359 1.000               
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.238 -0.320 -0.112 0.044 1.000             
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.587 -0.345 -0.169 -0.198 -0.026 1.000           
Female education -0.655 0.525 0.212 0.146 0.096 -0.419 1.000         
Income inequality 0.061 0.094 0.026 0.324 -0.030 0.126 0.313 1.000       
Distance from the equator -0.381 0.417 0.139 -0.085 -0.471 -0.360 0.017 -0.291 1.000     
Percentage of population Muslim 0.283 -0.156 -0.188 -0.303 -0.117 0.093 -0.573 -0.370 0.182 1.000   
Access to safe water -0.410 0.633 0.320 -0.035 -0.039 -0.241 0.320 -0.086 0.326 -0.204 1.000 
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Table D.3: Correlation matrix, Education-PEFA 
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Education attainment 1.000             
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted 2005$) 0.523 1.000           
PFM quality (PEFA) 0.339 0.494 1.000         
Public spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.091 -0.266 0.110 1.000       
Adult literacy rate 0.666 0.559 0.374 -0.100 1.000     
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.386 -0.379 -0.490 0.188 -0.323 1.000   
Percentage of population Muslim -0.059 -0.092 0.079 -0.057 -0.402 -0.136 1.000 
 
Table D.4: Correlation matrix, Education-CPIA 
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Education attainment 1.000             
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted 2005$) 0.442 1.000           
PFM quality (CPIA) 0.404 0.295 1.000         
Public spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.025 -0.147 0.092 1.000       
Adult literacy rate 0.573 0.498 0.141 0.119 1.000     
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.368 -0.254 -0.249 0.067 -0.367 1.000   
Percentage of population Muslim -0.450 -0.331 -0.283 0.130 -0.598 0.285 1.000 
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Appendix E. Results from Robustness Controls 
 
Table E.1: Results from robustness control for non-linearity 
Dependent Variable→  Under-5 mortality (ln) Education attainment (ln) 
Independent Variable ↓ Regression →  Health PEFA Health CPIA Education PEFA Education CPIA 
GDP per capita in PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) -0.248043** -0.235644 0.058930 -0.024541 
  (-2.487876) (-1.532568) (1.141140) (-0.400037) 
PFM quality (PEFA) -0.212036   -0.052983   
  (-1.153137)   (-0.692152)   
PFM quality (CPIA)   -0.117766   0.243654** 
    (-0.456503)   (2.698578) 
Public spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.407594 0.389670 0.151872 0.665439* 
  (-0.767529) (0.404288) (0.632460) (1.817163) 
PFM quality (PEFA)*Public spending (ln) 0.151590   0.011333   
  (0.921304)   (0.108140)   
PFM quality (CPIA)*Public spending (ln)   -0.173849   -0.181588* 
    (-0.594169)   (-1.739024) 
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.121992 0.207251     
  (0.841514) (1.329592)     
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.783180*** 0.586690** -0.060746 -0.057296 
  (3.214535) (2.676958) (-0.523683) (-0.473089) 
Female education -0.009891** -0.010836**     
  (-2.642715) (-2.281059)     
Adult literacy rate     0.006152** 0.005297 
      (2.354745) (1.690805) 
Income inequality 0.011561 0.011939     
  (1.360656) (1.209448)     
Distance from the equator 0.020044 0.475543     
  (0.029160) (0.669004)     
Percentage of population Muslim 0.003786 0.001233 0.000786 -0.000939 
  (1.446702) (0.553179) (0.770577) (-0.626341) 
Access to safe water -0.011414** -0.004846     
  (-2.108381) (-0.933800)     
Constant 6.871888*** 6.280498*** 3.583439*** 3.369038*** 
  (7.721360) (4.569869) (12.41453) (7.901775) 
Public spending^2 -0.067773 0.211829  -0.123603 -0.084796 
  (-0.290187) (0.899540) (-0.884957) (-0.823809) 
R
2
 0.906287 0.811949 0.527875 0.496852 
Number of observation 37 37 34 37 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.007  
Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.   
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Table E.2: Results from robustness control including lagged public spending 
 
Dependent Variable→ Under-5 mortality (ln)
Independent Variable ↓ Regression → Health PEFA Health PEFA Health PEFA Health PEFA Health PEFA Health CPIA
Public spending(-1) Public spending(-2) Public spending(-3) Public spending(-4) Public spending(-5) Public spending(-1-5)
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) -0.245986** -0.241351** -0.243073** -0.214075** -0.287323** -0.278283
(-2.461636) (-2.545204) (-2.456085) (-2.121198) (-2.833446) (-1.651636)
PFM quality (PEFA) -0.197453 -0.270710 -0.275227 -0.243209 -0.398905**
(-1.129759) (-1.591010) (-1.515374) (-1.337835) (-2.129459)
PFM quality (CPIA) -0.166003
(-0.635730)
Public health spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.550141 -0.696764 -0.717208 -0.514160 -1.424756* 0.414435
(-0.859226) (-1.138154) (-1.071992) (-0.752057) (-1.810678) (0.422181)
PFM quality (PEFA)*Public spending (ln) 0.134196 0.150173 0.155044 0.123286 0.268026
(0.882000) (1.038721) (0.980190) (0.776206) (1.619076)
PFM quality (CPIA)*Public spending (ln) -0.112790
(-0.391593)
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.137540 0.166328 0.166316 0.165561 0.127399 0.215651
(1.027019) (1.300176) (1.271721) (1.278572) (1.037970) (1.361851)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.784002*** 0.876673*** 0.875600*** 0.883530*** 0.990491*** 0.557429**
(3.201705) (3.694748) (3.605010) (3.672604) (4.277525) (2.542489)
Female education -0.009793** -0.008626** -0.008499** -0.010062** -0.007622** -0.010947**
(-2.571161) (-2.354267) (-2.111452) (-2.399972) (-1.853286) (-2.211581)
Income inequality 0.011633 0.013689 0.013994 0.012686 0.020470** 0.011562
(1.366538) (1.680375) (1.547229) (1.406229) (2.199132) (1.117383)
Distance from the equator 0.096734 -0.076988 -0.084946 -0.144974 0.372466 0.392601
(0.154215) (-0.127905) (-0.136528) (-0.234562) (0.587115) (0.535354)
Percentage of population Muslim 0.003546 0.005134* 0.005233* 0.004891* 0.004483 0.001325
(1.415653) (2.039736) (1.857602) (1.744750) (1.702934) (0.586382)
Access to safe water -0.012103** -0.010109** -0.010156** -0.010279** -0.008304* -0.002779
(-2.559359) (-2.195099) (-2.143124) (-2.190315) (-1.843551) (-0.548238)
Constant 6.869348*** 6.612274*** 6.622181*** 6.473099*** 6.795781*** 6.593124***
(7.662769) (7.680375) (7.461086) (7.293515) (8.027231) (4.433622)
Private health spending (-1) 0.071082 -0.534784 -0.548727 -0.763298 -0.671171
(0.155900) (-0.998057) (-0.960940) (-1.287276) (-1.204832)
Private health spending (-2) 0.778968* 0.846788 1.019266 1.219477
(1.915621) (0.953653) (1.144189) (1.451665)
Private health spending (-3) -0.053540 -0.627459 -0.263722
(-0.086436) (-0.806959) (-0.351361)
Private health spending (-4) 0.537362 1.569796**
(1.200680) (2.353665)
Private health spending (-5) -1.274275*
(-1.989618)
Private health spending (mean 1-5) 0.083086
(0.407699)
R2 0.906054 0.918980 0.919008 0.924211 0.936733 0.806946
Number of observation 37 37 37 37 37 37
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
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Table E.3: Results from robustness control using infant mortality as dependent variable in 
health regressions 
Dependent Variable→  Under-1 mortality (ln) 
Independent Variable ↓ Regression →  Health PEFA Health CPIA 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) -0.200725** -0.190333 
  (-2.510885) (-1.420214) 
PFM quality (PEFA) -0.179268   
  (-1.273091)   
PFM quality (CPIA)   -0.162817 
    (-0.727180) 
Public health spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.403950 0.415273 
  (-1.067920) (0.493262) 
PFM quality (PEFA)*Public spending (ln) 0.095175   
  (0.771609)   
PFM quality (CPIA)*Public spending (ln)   -0.115464 
    (-0.463089) 
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.119230 0.188543 
  (1.097880) (1.379393) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.580999*** 0.411916** 
  (2.937594) (2.194086) 
Female education -0.008428** -0.010130** 
  (-2.771839) (-2.461878) 
Inqome inequality 0.010994 0.011509 
  (1.596964) (1.334108) 
Distance from the equator 0.333189 0.607233 
  (0.655938) (0.974679) 
Percentage of population Muslim 0.002843 0.000294 
  (1.399486) (0.150400) 
Access to safe water -0.010939*** -0.002299 
  (-2.878087) (-0.537636) 
Constant 6.159604*** 5.657958*** 
  (8.549328) (4.707499) 
R
2
 0.910468 0.778921 
Number of observation 37 37 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 
Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
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Table E.4: Results from robustness control excluding the individual PFM variable 
Dependent Variable→  Under-5 mortality (ln) Education attainment (ln) 
Independent Variable ↓ Regression →  Health PEFA Health CPIA Education PEFA Education CPIA 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) -0.234607** -0.253594* 0.050646 0.031253 
 
(-2.422809) (-1.687858) (1.203706) (0.488733) 
Public health spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.078409 0.956369* 0.184615 -0.011979 
 
(-0.268916) (1.962095) (0.969773) (-0.039604) 
PFM quality (PEFA)*Public spending (ln) -0.017731 
 
-0.058089 
 
 
(-0.256283) 
 
(-0.904244) 
 PFM quality (CPIA)*Public spending (ln) 
 
-0.261169* 
 
0.011077 
  
(-2.033696) 
 
(0.129066) 
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.113620 0.227290 
  
 
(0.872895) (1.507179) 
  Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.746904*** 0.522983** -0.062918 -0.117012 
 
(3.131435) (2.519643) (-0.603056) (-0.902304) 
Female education -0.010663*** -0.012128** 
  
 
(-2.934931) (-2.695431) 
  Adult literacy rate 
  
0.006114** 0.005390 
   
(2.399170) (1.657406) 
Income inequality 0.011820 0.015182* 
  
 
(1.412955) (1.734614) 
  Distance from the equator -0.156125 0.479399 
  
 
(-0.272235) (0.687792) 
  Percentage of population Muslim 0.003082 0.001333 0.000951 -0.000709 
 
(1.267442) (0.608107) (0.965578) (-0.432381) 
Access to safe water -0.011128** -0.003118 
  
 
(-2.462028) (-0.650892) 
  Constant 6.354230*** 5.821651*** 3.528936*** 3.745410*** 
 
(8.375240) (5.907236) (12.81358) (8.425451) 
R
2
 0.901055 0.802855 0.510665 0.347658 
Number of observation 37 37 34 37 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000 0.002 0.034 
Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
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Table E.5: Results from robustness control with larger sample size in the Health-PEFA 
regression, excluding female literacy and income inequality 
Dependent Variable→  Under-5 mortality (ln)   
Independent Variable ↓ Regression →  Health PEFA Health PEFA Health PEFA 
  Exc. Fem. Lit. Exc. Income ineq. Exc. Fem. Lit & Income ineq. 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) -0.387668*** -0.190581** -0.400059*** 
 
(-4.930145) (-2.240049) (-5.671887) 
PFM quality (PEFA) -0.145017 -0.059267 -0.129593 
 
(-0.837695) (-0.465880) (-1.276605) 
Public health spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.407192 0.165829 -0.044385 
 
(-0.954788) (0.534149) (-0.176169) 
PFM quality (PEFA)*Public spending (ln) 0.123106 -0.056646 0.022834 
 
(0.818247) (-0.538633) (0.262818) 
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.103977 0.168062* 0.180158** 
 
(0.939570) (1.965009) (2.389123) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.951908*** 0.539696*** 0.655647*** 
 
(4.645854) (2.820380) (3.852337) 
Female education 
 
-0.010659*** 
 
  
(-2.816909) 
 Income inequality 0.011187 
  
 
(1.348160) 
  Distance from the equator 0.150598 -0.891439 0.290324 
 
(0.257492) (-1.500664) (0.576118) 
Percentage of population Muslim 0.005524*** 0.002287 0.001925 
 
(2.787501) (1.067651) (1.200270) 
Access to safe water -0.008475** -0.006700* -0.006623** 
 
(-2.190179) (-1.881057) (-2.150723) 
Constant 6.779747*** 6.509127*** 7.343382*** 
 
(9.147421) (9.613808) (13.64148) 
R
2
 0.848349 0.843980 0.793117 
Number of observation 48 55 78 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Restet-test 
   Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
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Table E.6: Results from robustness control with larger sample size in the Health-CPIA 
regression, excluding female literacy and income inequality 
Dependent Variable→  Under-5 mortality (ln)   
Independent Variable ↓ Regression →  Health CPIA Health CPIA Health CPIA 
 
Exc. Fem. Lit. Exc. Income ineq. Exc. Fem. Lit & Income ineq. 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) -0.414724*** -0.139533 -0.477664*** 
 
(-3.017763) (-1.142158) (-4.784995) 
PFM quality (CPIA) -0.404207 -0.335159* -0.500958** 
 
(-1.529798) (-1.780626) (-2.434529) 
Public health spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.522709 0.133296 -1.282634* 
 
(-0.525336) (0.185059) (-1.867636 
PFM quality (CPIA)*Public spending (ln) 0.182654 0.005429 0.367590* 
 
(0.619629) (0.025238) (1.716518) 
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.022737 0.354463*** 0.187423* 
 
(-0.156939) (3.518325) (1.925128) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.744992*** 0.564907*** 0.622043*** 
 
(3.428570) (3.137490) (3.335569) 
Female education 
 
-0.012814*** 
 
  
(-3.495366) 
 Income inequality 0.003885 
  
 
(0.374243) 
  Distance from the equator 0.080431 0.704492 0.533833 
 
(0.111916) (1.243769) (0.883424) 
Percentage of population Muslim 0.004061* -0.001652 0.002059 
 
(2.035713) (-0.997619) (1.323330) 
Access to safe water -0.002119 -0.007311** -0.008285** 
 
(-0.395536) (-2.087338) (-2.164144) 
Constant 8.182786*** 6.878638*** 9.473322*** 
 
(6.054738) (6.497003) (9.603715) 
R
2
 0.740396 0.816985 0.772443 
Number of observation 38 54 61 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
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Table E.7: Results from robustness control with larger sample size in the education 
regressions, excluding adult literacy 
Dependent Variable→  Education attainment (ln) 
Independent Variable ↓ Regression →  Education PEFA Education CPIA 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) 0.109595** 0.033813 
 
(2.757926) (0.728300) 
PFM quality (PEFA) 0.018264 
 
 
(0.312551) 
 PFM quality (CPIA) 
 
0.255895*** 
  
(2.866127) 
Public health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.077242 0.842789** 
 
(0.399571) (2.720165) 
PFM quality (PEFA)*Public spending (ln) -0.040997 
 
 
(-0.548016) 
 PFM quality (CPIA)*Public spending (ln) 
 
-0.252230** 
  
(-2.633178) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.021074 -0.089001 
 
(0.223223) (-0.754204) 
Percentage of population Muslim -0.000694 -0.003228** 
 
(-0.866864) (-3.029998) 
Constant 3.488294*** 3.294555*** 
  (13.98959) (8.332570) 
R
2
 0.366764 0.464292 
Number of observation 47 42 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.004 0.001 
Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 
1%. 
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Table E.8: Results from robustness control from the panel estimation 
Dependent Variable→  Under-5 mortality (ln) 
Independent Variable ↓ Regression →  Health CPIA 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) -0.000232*** 
  (-7.543474) 
PFM quality (CPIA) 0.008033 
  (0.307219) 
Public health spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.018951 
  (-0.207244) 
PFM quality (CPIA)*Public spending (ln) -0.008821 
  (-0.312892) 
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.082073*** 
  (-2.644494) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.484126** 
  (2.494011) 
Female education -0.007305** 
  (-2.059490) 
Inqome inequality 0.010279 
  (1.281597) 
Distance from the equator 0.381766 
  (0.674358) 
Percentage of population Muslim 0.000683 
  (0.364729) 
Access to safe water -0.013767*** 
  (-5.797370) 
Constant 5.504332*** 
  (11.90758) 
R
2
 0.598293 
Number of observation 222 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
and *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix F. Results from Excluding Outliners 
Table F.1: Results from robustness control excluding outliners 
Dependent Variable→  Under-5 mortality (ln) Education attainment (ln)   
Regression →  Health-PEFA Health-CPIA Education-CPIA Education-PEFA Education-CPIA 
Independent Variable ↓ Outliner →  PEFA
41
 CPIA
42
 CPIA
43
 Education
44
 Education
45
 
GDP per capita in PPP adjusted 2005$ (ln) -0.225434** -0.251829 -0.015721 0.043426 0.028535 
  (-2.573693) (-1.681960) (-0.257465) (1.225739) (0.526417) 
PFM quality (PEFA) -0.154642     0.008352   
  (-0.991188)     (0.173850)   
PFM quality (CPIA)   -0.140518 0.257925***   0.164861* 
    (-0.561466) (2.820629)   (2.017336) 
Public spending as share of GDP (ln) -0.096298 0.690714 0.566786 0.396136** 0.562243* 
  (-0.220305) (0.723494) (1.634595) (2.323687) (1.890001) 
PFM quality (PEFA)*Public spending (ln) 0.008747         
  (0.061613)         
PFM quality (CPIA)*Public spending (ln)   -0.182077 -0.178603* -0.117366* -0.175869* 
    (-0.642494) (-1.703372) (-1.850314) (-1.955478) 
Private health spending as share of GDP (ln) 0.003043 0.197615       
  (0.023353) (1.291520)       
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.463539* 0.573301** -0.083110 0.016718 -0.103825 
  (1.866783) (2.719228) (-0.694814) (0.208718) (-1.011526) 
Female education 0.011961*** -0.009477*       
  (-3.511633) (-1.959631)       
Adult literacy     0.003764 0.006808*** 0.001394 
      (1.187303) (3.802722) (0.510318) 
Income inequality 0.003625 0.012591       
  (0.449052) (1.306395)       
Distance from the equator -0.681842 0.501970       
  (-1.085531) (0.720112)       
Percentage of population Muslim 0.002332 0.001517 -0.001137 0.000991 -0.001891 
  (1.030122) (0.692841) (-0.752935) (1.437431) (-1.438049) 
Access to safe water -0.010891** -0.003788       
  (-2.605445) (-0.790169)       
Constant 7.454101*** 6.261440*** 3.378523*** 3.479228*** 3.555577*** 
  (9.121937) (4.653912) (7.890210) (18.07023) (9.568837) 
R
2
 0.925240 0.812829 0.477608 0.695996 0.442614 
Number of observation 35 35 36 33 36 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000003 0.006310 0.000035 0.013298 
Note: T-statistics in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.   
 
                                                     
41
 Brazil and South Africa is excluded from the sample. 
42
 Armenia and Burkina Faso is excluded from the sample. 
43
 Burkina Faso is excluded from the sample. 
44
 Uganda is excluded in the sample. 
45
 Chad is excluded in the sample. 
